Showing posts with label Ali Abunimah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ali Abunimah. Show all posts

Jul 7, 2009

Hamas' Choice: Recognition or Resistance in the Age of Obama

Palestine Center Brief No. 179 (6 July 2009)

Policy Brief

By Ali Abunimah

In a major policy speech on 25 June 2009, Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas' political bureau, tried to do what may be impossible: present the Islamist Palestinian resistance organization as a willing partner in a U.S.-led peace process, while holding on to his movement's political principles and base [1].

This is the dilemma that every Palestinian leadership, and perhaps almost every liberation movement, has eventually had to confront. It is a choice, as political scientist Tamim Barghouti has pointed out, between recognition and legitimacy [2]. According to Barghouti, the old-guard Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership, when confronted with the same dilemma, chose recognition and forfeited its legitimacy, opening the way for Hamas to emerge. Now, it is the turn of Hamas: the price demanded by the United States and its allies for Hamas to be taken as an interlocutor is the abandonment of the very principles on which the movement built its mass support.

Meshaal's nearly hour-long "address to the Palestinian people and the world" was billed as a response to the speeches of U.S. President Barack Obama in Cairo and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earlier in June.

In his Cairo speech, Obama called for Americans and Muslims to engage in a "sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect one another; and to seek common ground." If he is serious about that, he--and others--should pay close attention to what Hamas is saying to domestic, regional and international audiences. Meshaal's goals--very much in tension--were to show that his movement is ready to do business with the United States, set out political red lines, reassure the movements supporters and Palestinians generally and deal with internal Palestinian divisions.

To begin with, the speech sought to present Hamas as a nationalist movement whose Islamism fits within a mainstream Palestinian consensus. Meshaal used an explicitly ecumenical message to counter Netanyahu's exclusivist Jewish claims to the land of Palestine. According to Meshaal, Palestinians roots stretched back thousands of years "in this blessed land of prophets and messages, of [Muhammad's] night ascension, of Muslim and Christian holy sites al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock, the Nativity Church and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre."

More generally, he sought to portray Muslims as representing the very values Westerners claim to cherish most and dissociating Hamas from lurid and false comparisons to such groups as the Taliban. "We [Muslims] are the ones who introduced the world and humanity to science, civilization, culture and lofty humanitarian values," Meshaal declared, "values such as justice, freedom, equality, compassion and tolerance, and the values of interaction between civilizations and not a confrontation between them."

Meshaal welcomed a "change of tone" from President Obama but emphasized repeatedly that only a change of policy would matter. He nevertheless claimed the new tone as the fruit of the "stubborn steadfastness of the people of the region, while resisting in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan." Such resistance, according to Meshaal, frustrated the former U.S. President George W. Bush administration's plans for regional domination, prompting American voters to seek a different path to extricate their country from mounting crises and quagmires.

He chided regional leaders who had "marketed and promoted" Bushs policies. "Had the people of the region listened to them," Meshaal said, "the policy of Bush and the neoconservatives might have succeeded and the region's situation would be worse than imaginable." Meshaal voiced the widespread skepticism and perhaps hopes that Obama's promises amounted to more than the similar words about Palestine heard from the Bush administration.

Responding to Obama's recital of history, Meshaal did not seek to deny the Nazi Holocaust but to appropriate it. He took Obama to task for dwelling in detail on the "suffering of the Jews and their holocaust in Europe, while ignoring our present suffering and Israel's holocaust against our Palestinian people that has been continuing for decades."

Meshaal emphasized that even though Palestinians have heard only words, they were prepared to judge the U.S. by its actions, which would have to "begin with reconstruction of Gaza and the lifting of the blockade, lifting the oppression and security pressure in the West Bank, and allowing Palestinian reconciliation to take its course without external pressures or interference."

The "only thing" that can convince Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims, Meshaal stated, "is genuine American and international will and efforts to end the occupation and lift the oppression from our people, to allow them to exercise their right to self-determination and the fulfillment of their national rights." When the Obama administration makes such an initiative, Meshaal said, "then we and all our people's forces will be ready to cooperate with it and with any international effort in that direction."

Obama's "new language toward Hamas," Meshaal underlined, "is the first step in the right direction towards direct dialogue without conditions." And that is the crux of the matter. Dealing with Hamas, Meshaal said, must be based on the recognition of its democratic mandate and not via the imposition of arbitrary conditions such as those of the Quartet which call on the movement to recognize Israel, abandon violence and commit by previously signed agreements.

Meshaal reasserted Hamas' political red lines while maintaining a sense of flexibility. In particular, Meshaal:
Rejected the Palestinian state envisaged by the Israeli leader as a "deformed entity, a large prison for detention and suffering, and not the national home a great people deserves."

Rejected Israel's demand to be recognized as a "Jewish state"--and warned against any Arab or Palestinian acquiescence--"because it means canceling the right to return to their homes of six million refugees, and the forced expulsion of our people in the 1948 areas [Palestinian citizens of Israel] from their cities and villages." Israel's demand, according to Meshaal, is no different than racist demands made by fascist Italy and the Nazis.

Reaffirmed Hamas previous acceptance of the program that represents the minimum demands of our people, for the establishment of a Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem with complete sovereignty on the borders of June 4, 1967, after the withdrawal of the occupation forces, and the dismantling of all the settlements, and the realization of the Right of Return.

Reaffirmed that "the refugees' Right of Return to the homes from which they were expelled in 1948 is a national right and an individual right held personally" by the refugees "and no leader or negotiator can waive it or compromise on it."

Meshaal also offered a nuanced response to Obama's call on Palestinians to abandon "dead end" violence in favor of nonviolent resistance. "We reaffirm our adherence to resistance as a strategic choice to liberate the homeland and restore our rights," Meshaal said, citing armed European resistance to Nazi Germany, American resistance to British rule and the Vietnamese and South African anti-colonial struggles as precedents for Palestinians.
"Nonviolent resistance is appropriate in a struggle for civil rights," Meshaal argued, "But when it comes to a military occupation using conventional and nonconventional weapons, such an occupation can only be confronted with armed resistance." Palestinians were forced to take up arms, Meshaal said. He could also have been implying that if Palestinians changed the definition of their struggle as being one for civil rights then the appropriate means of resistance would also change.

"Resistance is a means and not an end," Meshaal said, "and it is not blind. Indeed it perceives the changes underway." Yet, while staunchly defending the right to armed resistance--and even threatening new operations to take Israeli soldiers prisoner if it was the only way to free Palestinians prisoners--Meshaal also recognized other forms of struggle. He called for increased Palestinian, Arab and international solidarity efforts, including ongoing efforts to break the siege on Gaza, to resist the apartheid Wall and settlements and to prevent home demolitions and "Judaiziation" in Jerusalem.

For Hamas leaders, the dangers of submitting to western preconditions can be seen merely by looking at the trajectory of the PLO leadership which recognized Israel in 1993, renounced armed struggle and signed the Oslo accords. Since that time, Meshaal argued, the occupation and its oppression deepened as the number of Israeli settlements and Palestinian prisoners grew.

As Meshaal put it, "These conditions do not end; as soon as the Palestinian negotiator commits to one, more conditions are imposed. For example, first the condition was to recognize Israel, now it is to recognize the Jewishness of Israel. Then, that Jerusalem is its eternal capital, giving up the Right of Return, accepting that settlement blocks will remain. Then [Palestinians] must not only abandon resistance, but themselves work to oppress, pursue and disarm the resistance."

The latter point was a reference to the arrest campaign in the West Bank and what Meshaal called other "oppressive measures undertaken by the [Palestinian] Authority and the government of Salam Fayyad and its security forces under the supervision of the American General [Keith] Dayton." Meshaal presented this ongoing cooperation between the Ramallah security forces, Israel and the U.S. as the biggest obstacle to Palestinian reconciliation talks in Cairo aimed at restoring a unified national leadership.

After Hamas won the 2006 legislative election, the Bush administration began a program overseen by Dayton to arm and train anti-Hamas militias nominally loyal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The campaign has been accompanied by what Hamas and some human rights groups have described as a systematic crackdown on politicians, professors, charities and journalists suspected of sympathy or links with Hamas. Hamas has often retaliated by arresting Fateh-linked individuals in the Gaza Strip. In recent weeks, the Dayton-supervised militias have killed several members of Hamas in the West Bank ostensibly while trying to arrest them. Meshaal cleverly drew attention to the external role in fuelling Palestinian divisions--and how little has actually changed from the Bush administration--by "calling on Obama to withdraw Dayton from the West Bank and return him to the United States, in keeping with the new spirit of change."

Throughout the speech, Meshaal sought to reassure Palestinians that Hamas would not abandon its core principles in pursuit of recognition and power. "The land is more important than authority, and liberation before a state," he said at one point, and "no Palestinian leadership has the right to waive Palestinian national rights and interests as the price for recognition."

Some Palestinians worry that despite such assurances, Hamas has already set off down the very path Meshaal warned about and risks squandering the sacrifices Palestinians made, especially in Gaza. Haidar Eid, an independent analyst in Gaza, wrote before Meshaal's speech that some of the early enthusiastic Hamas responses to Obama's Cairo speech, as well as acceptance of the two-state solution, indicated "the beginning of a process of deterioration--even Osloization--not only in rhetoric, but also in action" [3]. This writer has heard similar fears voiced by Palestinians from the West Bank and recently in Amman. Given that many Palestinians consider that a previous generation of resistance leaders turn their backs on their peoples most fundamental interests and rights--all the while claiming to uphold them--such fears are far from irrational or uncommon.

Another analysis of Hamas' shift currently circulating argues that Hamas has accepted the Palestinian "consensus" position of a two-state solution on every inch of the 1967 occupied territories with removal of all settlements and with the Right of Return. But it knows that no potential peace deal coming from the Obama initiative will ever reach even these minimal conditions, and that if Abbas and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert could not reach even the outlines of an agreement after two years of negotiations, the chances of any deal with a Netanyahu-Lieberman government are even tinier. In this scenario, Hamas need not stand in the way of a two-state solution because it will fail anyway. But by saying it would accept that minimalist outcome, it would avoid blame for the failure and its adherence to resistance would be vindicated.

What we do know is that Hamas' leaders, and the Palestinians generally, have been placed under intense pressure, occupation, blockades, starvation sieges and recurrent Israeli war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the vast majority so far has not submitted to Israeli conditions. But while emphasizing the role of resistance and struggle to achieve liberation, Hamas has not offered a clear vision of what liberation looks like other than the unconvincing and increasingly unrealistic two-state vision (leaving aside its long, outdated, though much-cited charter that offers no guide to the movements current thinking).

Meshaal's speech confirms Hamas' long-term shift away from Islamist rhetoric toward mainstream Palestinian nationalist discourse. It indicates that Hamas is highly sensitive to international and Palestinian public opinion and is aware that Palestinians need to build real international solidarity as part of a strategy to level the glaring power imbalance with Israel. But it is not prepared to seek recognition at any price. All this has implications for the movement's message and methods.

This leaves the field open for an urgent debate among Palestinians about what that future vision should be and what role resistance in all its legitimate forms should play. No group of leaders, whether from Hamas or any other organization, could or should carry the burden of restoring Palestinian rights by itself. Hamas, like other Palestinian organizations, can only be a guardian of fundamental rights to the extent that it is embedded in a broader movement mobilized in Palestine and globally to defend those rights.

And if Hamas' potential interlocutors are sincerely seeking ways to recognize the democratic mandate of the movement without trying to force it to forfeit its legitimacy, there are precedents. South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were both able to take part in successful political negotiations that got their respective countries out of disastrous political and military stalemates without being required to submit to unacceptable preconditions. That took a measure of leadership, foresight and political courage by others that has been notably absent in international dealings with Hamas.

Ali Abunimah is an expert on Palestine, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and is the author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse. Abunimah also co-founded The Electronic Intifada, an online publication about Palestine and the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Electronic Iraq and Electronic Lebanon.

Notes:

[1] The speech is in Arabic. All excerpts quoted in this article are the author’s translation. A transcript and recording of the speech were made available by the Palestinian Information Center, a Hamas-affiliated website. See: http://bit.ly/mK7kS.
[2] In a paper given at the Annual Symposium of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University on the theme: “Palestine and the Palestinians Today,” April 2-3, 2009, Washington, DC.
[3] Eid, Haidar, “Hamas’ political immaturity,” The Electronic Intifada, 25 June 2009, (http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10620.shtml).


The views expressed in this information brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund.
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Feb 27, 2009

Politico Quotes Palestine Center Fellow

In "Israeli nationalist, charm offensive", Politico writer Ben Smith discussed Yisrael Beitanu leader Avigdor Lieberman, whose electoral success in Israel alarms many. Smith wrote that supporters of Israel in the United States are embracing him to dilute the negative PR consequences of his role in Israeli politics. At the same time, Lieberman is distancing himself publicly from his rich record of anti-Palestinian positions.

In the article, Smith quoted Ali Abunimah:
“Lieberman's politics are truly odious, racist and incompatible with any notion of democracy and equality in a modern state,” said Ali Abunimah, a fellow at the Palestine Center in Washington. He added that “much of the anti-Arab racism he expresses publicly is deeply embedded in Israel's society, economy, and political system and tacitly endorsed by all the other major Zionist parties.”
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Feb 12, 2009

Abunimah: No peace for Israel

No Peace for Israel
By Ali Abunimah
guardian.co.uk

Whenever Israel has an election, pundits begin the usual refrain that hopes for peace depend on the "peace camp" – formerly represented by the Labour party, but now by Tzipi Livni's Kadima prevailing over the anti-peace right, led by the Likud.

This has never been true, and makes even less sense as Israeli parties begin coalition talks after Tuesday's election. Yes, the "peace camp" helped launch the "peace process", but it did much more to undermine the chances for a just settlement.

In 1993, Labour prime minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo accords. Ambiguities in the agreement – which included no mention of "self-determination" or "independence" for Palestinians, or even "occupation" – made it easier to clinch a short-term deal. But confrontation over irreconcilable expectations was inevitable. While Palestinians hoped the Palestinian Authority, created by the accord, would be the nucleus of an independent state, Israel viewed it as little more than a native police force to suppress resistance to continued occupation and colonial settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Collaboration with Israel has always been the measure by which any Palestinian leader is judged to be a "peace partner". Rabin, according to Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister, "never thought this [Oslo] will end in a full-fledged Palestinian state". He was right.

Throughout the "peace process", Israeli governments, regardless of who led them, expanded Jewish-only settlements in the heart of the West Bank, the territory supposed to form the bulk of the Palestinian state. In the 1990s, Ehud Barak's Labour-led government actually approved more settlement expansion than the Likud-led government that preceded it headed by Binyamin Netanyahu.

Barak, once considered "dovish", promoted a bloodthirsty image in the campaign, bolstered by the massacres of Gaza civilians he directed as defence minister. "Who has he ever shot?" Barak quipped derisively about Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of the proto-fascist Yisrael Beitenu party, in an attempt to paint the latter as a lightweight.

Today, Lieberman's party, which beat Labour into third place, will play a decisive role in a government. An immigrant who came to Israel from the former Soviet republic of Moldova, Lieberman was once a member of the outlawed racist party Kach that calls for expelling all Palestinians.

Yisrael Beitenu's manifesto was that 1.5 million Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel (indigenous survivors or descendants of the Palestinian majority ethnically cleansed in 1948) be subjected to a loyalty oath. If they don't swear allegiance to the "Jewish state" they would lose their citizenship and be forced from the land of their birth, joining millions of already stateless Palestinians in exile or in Israeli-controlled ghettos. In a move instigated by Lieberman but supported by Livni's allegedly "centrist" Kadima, the Knesset recently voted to ban Arab parties from participating in elections. Although the high court overturned it in time for the vote, it is an ominous sign of what may follow.

Lieberman, who previously served as deputy prime minister, has a long history of racist and violent incitement. Prior to Israel's recent attack, for example, he demanded Israel subject Palestinians to the brutal and indiscriminate violence Russia used in Chechyna. He also called for Arab Knesset members who met with officials from Hamas to be executed.

But it's too easy to make him the bogeyman. Israel's narrow political spectrum now consists at one end of the former "peace camp" that never halted the violent expropriation of Palestinian land for Jewish settlements and boasts with pride of the war crimes in Gaza, and at the other, a surging far-right whose "solutions" vary from apartheid to outright ethnic cleansing.

What does not help is brazen western hypocrisy. Already the US state department spokesman affirmed that the Obama administration would work with whatever coalition emerged from Israel's "thriving democracy" and promised that the US would not interfere in Israel's "internal politics". Despite Barack Obama's sweet talk about a new relationship with the Arab world, few will fail to notice the brazen double standard. In 2006, Hamas won a democratic election in the occupied territories, observed numerous unilateral or agreed truces that were violated by Israel, offered Israel a generation-long truce to set the stage for peace, and yet it is still boycotted by the US and European Union.

Worse, the US sponsored a failed coup against Hamas and continues to arm and train the anti-Hamas militias of Mahmoud Abbas, whose term as Palestinian Authority president expired on 9 January. As soon as he took office, Obama reaffirmed this boycott of Palestinian democracy.

The clearest message from Israel's election is that no Zionist party can solve Israel's basic conundrum and no negotiations will lead to a two-state solution. Israel could only be created as a "Jewish state" by the forced removal of the non-Jewish majority Palestinian population. As Palestinians once again become the majority in a country that has defied all attempts at partition, the only way to maintain Jewish control is through ever more brazen violence and repression of resistance (see Gaza). Whatever government emerges is certain to preside over more settlement-building, racial discrimination and escalating violence.

There are alternatives that have helped end what once seemed like equally intractable and bloody conflicts: a South African-style one-person one-vote democracy, or Northern Ireland-style power-sharing. Only under a democratic system according rights to all the people of the country will elections have the power to transform people's futures.

But Israel today is lurching into open fascism. It is utterly disingenuous to continue to pretend – as so many do – that its failed leaders hold the key to getting out of the morass. Instead of waiting for them to form a coalition, we must escalate the international civil society campaign of boycott, divestment and sanctions to force Israelis to choose a saner path.

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Feb 2, 2009

Abunimah: Can Mitchell broker Belfast-style pact in Mideast?

This oped ran in the Detroit Free Press on 2 February 2009

BY ALI ABUNIMAH

President Barack Obama's appointment of former Sen. George Mitchell as his new Middle East envoy is a good choice. Mitchell showed evenhandedness uncharacteristic of U.S. officials when he led a fact-finding mission to the region in 2000.
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Had its recommendations been followed -- cessation of violence and a freeze on Israeli settlement construction on occupied Palestinian land -- the peace process might have made progress. Mitchell, who is already in the Middle East, helped broker the 1998 Belfast Agreement, the key to ending decades of strife in Northern Ireland. Because of historical similarities, that agreement is an important precedent for the Middle East.

Before 1948, European Jewish settlers in Palestine wanted their own state once British colonial rulers withdrew. But because Jews were a minority, the only way to achieve this was a partition that the majority Arab Palestinian population bitterly opposed. When Israel was established in 1948, most Palestinians were forced out. Those remaining became second-class citizens in a Jewish state.

The modern conflict in Ireland began when Great Britain, facing resistance from Irish nationalists, decided to withdraw after centuries. But the Protestant ruling class, a quarter of the population, insisted Ireland remain tied to Britain. These unionists, descended from English and Scottish settlers, refused to live in a state with a nationalist Catholic majority.

To appease the unionist minority, Britain partitioned Ireland in 1921, creating Northern Ireland, an entity whose legitimacy nationalists denied. As Israeli Jews did to Palestinians, Protestants institutionalized their own culture and religion as the official creed and violently suppressed expressions of nationalist identity.

The Mitchell-led Belfast Agreement ended Protestant hegemony in favor of equality. Decades of bloody conflict left deep social divisions, but a framework for nondiscriminatory democratic governance has allowed nationalists and unionists to begin to shed their siege mentalities. While formal partition remains, it is disappearing on the ground. Anyone can live, work and move freely, and official cross-border bodies are integrating the infrastructure and economies of the two jurisdictions.

The power-sharing executive in Belfast, led by staunchly nationalist Sinn Fein (closely affiliated with the IRA) and the hard-line Democratic Unionist Party, was once as inconceivable as a government made up Hamas and Israel's current government would be today. U.S. diplomacy played a key role by putting pressure on the stronger parties -- the British government and Protestant unionists. Instead of shunning Sinn Fein, the United States -- with prodding from Irish Americans -- insisted that it be brought into the process.

By 2010, Palestinians will outnumber Israeli Jews in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined. The two groups cannot be totally separated any more than Ireland's Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists could.

Like Irish nationalists, Palestinians will never recognize the "right" of another group to discriminate against them. Like Protestant unionists, Israeli Jews insist on their own state. Israel's solution is to cage Palestinians into ghettos -- like Gaza -- and periodically bomb them into submission.

If Mitchell is allowed to apply Northern Ireland's lessons, there may be a way out, but he'll face obstacles he didn't encounter in Belfast. The Obama administration remains committed to the failed partition formula of a Jewish state and a Palestinian state and maintains a misguided boycott of Hamas, which won Palestinian elections in 2006. And the Israel lobby -- much more powerful than Irish-American groups -- warps U.S. policy to favor the stronger side, an intransigent Israel. If these policies don't change, the hope Mitchell brings will be wasted, and escalating violence will fill the political vacuum.

ALI ABUNIMAH, a fellow at the Palestine Center in Washington, D.C., is author of "One Country, A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse." Write to him at abunimah01@yahoo.com.
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Jan 28, 2009

From Gaza to Obama: What Next for the Middle East?

Palestine Center Brief No. 174 (27 January 2009)

Information Brief

By Ali Abunimah
Palestine Center Fellow

Introduction

Israel's attack on the occupied Gaza Strip caused massive death and destruction. It has also profoundly changed the regional political landscape, calling for a deep reassessment of U.S. policy. It is into this perilous situation that U.S. President Barack Obama steps. Early moves, entirely consistent with statements during the campaign, indicate that the necessary reassessment will not soon be forthcoming.[1] Hence, despite the appointment of the well-respected and highly-experienced former U.S. Senator George Mitchell as envoy, the region should brace itself for enduring political stalemate and escalating violence.

Scorched Earth

Beginning on 27 December 2008, Israel bombarded the Gaza Strip by land, sea and air for 22 days. UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes echoed statements from Palestinians and international witnesses when he called the devastation in the coastal territory that is home to 1.5 million Palestinians "extremely shocking."

Amnesty International found "indisputable evidence" that Israel had indiscriminately used white phosphorus--that causes horrific injuries and death--in civilian areas.[2] There have been numerous allegations of other war crimes and atrocities, including summary executions of civilians, denial of medical care to the injured, the targeting of ambulances, medical personnel, UN facilities where civilians had sought shelter, as well as systematic targeting of private homes, police stations, universities, mosques, fishing boats, factories and workshops, government buildings and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).

In just three weeks, Israel killed more Palestinians in Gaza--at least 1,300--than in any previous year since it began its violence crackdown on the second intifada in 2000. Among the dead were 412 children and 110 women, according to health officials. Although large numbers of male civilians, including dozens of civilian police officers, were killed, exact numbers have not been reported. Among the 5,300 injured, 1,855 were children and 795 were women.[3] Thirteen Israelis, ten of them Israeli soldiers, also died. Preliminary estimates put the number of homes completely destroyed at more than 4,000 with 17,000 damaged. Tens of thousands are displaced or without shelter.

The enormous physical and psychological cost of Israel's attack, particularly on children, has yet to be fully calculated, and its consequences will be deep and lasting on a society that had already suffered from 61 years of dispossession, 41 years of military occupation and almost two years of total blockade.

Israel Lost Much More than It Gained

Israel's pretext for the Gaza attack--accepted by the United States and other western governments--was to stop indiscriminate rocket fire by Hamas from Gaza. It is indisputable, and Israel has acknowledged that Hamas did not fire any rockets at Israel from the moment a truce deal was reached on 19 June 2008 until after 4 November 2008, when rocket fire resumed. Israel had also acknowledged that Hamas moved to prevent other factions that fired about two dozen rockets over that four-month period from breaking the truce. Hamas resumed rocket fire only after Israel carried out a 4 November 2008 attack on Gaza that killed six Palestinians. Hamas allowed the already collapsed truce to formally lapse without renewal on 19 December 2008 primarily because Israel had refused to loosen the crippling blockade of Gaza or halt its armed attacks that had killed dozens of Palestinians during the truce.[4]

Although it wanted to prevent rocket fire, Israel's primary goals were to restore "deterrence" lost in its 2006 Lebanon debacle and to fatally weaken Hamas and rob it of political support. It achieved none of these goals; Hamas and other resistance groups still had rocket launching capability even after Israel declared a ceasefire. Hamas did not collapse as a military or political organization and retained the mass support without which a guerilla organization cannot function. Having survived an all-out assault from the Israeli war machine, Hamas emerged with significantly enhanced prestige among Palestinians and Arab public opinion, just as Hizballah did from its 2006 war with Israel.

In order to consolidate this support, Hamas will have to show that it can competently manage the aftermath, including assistance to the families' victims. Hamas leaders in Damascus and Gaza have already announced plans to distribute financial compensation and rebuild, again following precedents set by Hizballah.

Israel's Jewish citizens overwhelmingly supported the attack on Gaza and celebrated tactical "victories"--essentially their ability to inflict enormous pain and damage. With time, Israelis may begin to recognize that as in Lebanon they have suffered another strategic defeat: Israeli military power cannot cow entire populations into submission and cannot remake the politics of the region to reflect Israeli preferences. This lesson should have been learned after Israel's disastrous 1982 invasion of Lebanon but has yet to be absorbed by Israeli elites.

In addition to military power, Israel relies on Western support to maintain regional dominance. This pillar is starting to weaken as a consequence of Gaza; despite solid support from Western governments, Israel faced unprecedented waves of outrage from global public opinion and civil society as expressed in press commentary, enormous demonstrations and other mass actions. Israel's official hasbara (state propaganda) machinery was unable to suppress these mobilizations. One consequence is likely to be the mainstreaming of support for the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement, modeled on the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s, to force Israel to comply with international law.[5]

There have been unprecedented calls from international jurists, civil society organizations, UN officials, legislators and others for Israel to be held accountable. Israel is concerned enough that its officials and military officers may face war crimes charges that it has taken active countermeasures, such as tightening official censorship of accounts of actions taken by its army in Gaza and even on publishing the names of soldiers involved and offering legal support.[6]

For decades, Israel nurtured a narrative persuasive in the West that its creation, maintenance and conduct were the morally righteous legacy of the Nazi Holocaust. The long-term viability of this narrative as a means to mobilize political support and suppress criticism has been badly if not irrevocably degraded by Israel's actions in Gaza.

The Palestinian Authority and the Arab "Moderates" Lose Out

As part of the "War on Terror," the Bush administration divided a vast swathe of the planet from Morocco to Pakistan between so-called "moderates," on the one hand, and "extremists" on the other. A moderate is any actor that is in a patron-client relationship with the United States. In the Arab region, this group includes Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Lebanese government of Fouad Siniora (up to May 2008) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) headed by Mahmoud Abbas. An extremist, in this scheme, is any actor that opposes or resists U.S. hegemony in the region.

The labels, "moderate" and "extremist," clearly imply value judgments and were created to obscure underlying power relations and interests. They have nothing to do with democracy or Islamism; the most "moderate" regimes from the U.S. perspective are often the most undemocratic, repressive or theocratic (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, PA). Whereas, "extremists" may have received popular mandates at contested elections (Hamas, Hizballah, Iran) or be secular (Syria). What is at stake is America's ability to shore up a regional order it dominates, but that is coming apart at the seams. If the Gaza attack was supposed to tip the balance in favor of the moderates, it backfired even more spectacularly than Israel's war against Lebanon in 2006.

Among Palestinians, it is now conventional (though certainly not universal) to view Abbas, whose official term as PA president expired on 9 January 2009, as having zero legitimacy and credibility. Large segments of Palestinian public opinion view Abbas and his government headed by Salam Fayyad as irrelevant.[7] Hamas--through its own successes and survival and because there is no viable alternative--has effectively emerged as the closest thing Palestinians have to a national leadership. That is probably not a position Hamas can or wants to sustain, and there remains a pressing need for Palestinians themselves to create representative and inclusive bodies to guide the national movement.

Before Gaza, Hamas sought reconciliation while Abbas' leadership continued to impose U.S.-dictated conditions that Hamas would never meet. Now, as they feel their support draining away, some voices in Ramallah are calling for reconciliation on almost any terms. Others are opportunistically attempting to persuade Arab and international donors to channel desperately needed humanitarian aid for Gaza through Abbas in order to revive a dead political body.

In a 21 January 2009 "victory" speech broadcast live on Al Jazeera, Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal set out his movement's new terms for reconciliation: the PA would have to abandon "security cooperation" with Israel, release political prisoners and support and recognize resistance not "silly negotiations" (a mocking reference to Abbas" dismissal of Hamas' "silly rockets") as the foundation of a national program. Even as the PA becomes irrelevant, there are few signs it is capable of making such compromises that would jeopardize its last existing base of support, "the international community," and the Israeli government.

Thus, the Palestinians are entering a period, similar to the 1970s, where only credible leadership is isolated and scorned by Israel and its Western backers who continue to try to prop up or nurture pliable clients.

Arab Regimes More Divided than Ever over Israel, U.S.

The divisions between moderates and those resisting U.S. hegemony broke into open confrontation during the Gaza crisis, with the two blocs convening rival summits. The moderates, particularly Egypt, undoubtedly lost the political and public opinion battle. Throughout the region, there were unprecedented accusations of collusion with Israel directed at Egypt, which failed to mount an effective public defense.

Moderates boycotted an informal Arab summit convened by Qatar on 16 January 2009. Reflecting an official strategy of demonizing Iran, one of Egypt's official newspapers dismissed the Doha summit as "Persian" rather than "Arab."[8] Nevertheless, the PA's absence left the floor to Hamas to represent Palestinians, further enhancing the latter's status. Qatar, which hosts a major U.S. military base, and Mauritania cut off all ties with Israel. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pronounced the Arab Peace Initiative dead and suspended indirect Turkish-brokered peace talks with Israel.

Despite attempts to patch over differences at a 19 June 2008 meeting in Kuwait, Arab leaders remain deeply divided over relations with the United States and how to deal with Israel. Hamas' ability to deny Israel any strategic achievement in Gaza--like Hizballah's success in 2006--reinforced and expanded the constituency arguing that resistance is a viable option, and that without the power-balancing effects of resistance, no negotiations can achieve meaningful results. The moderates', supporting open-ended negotiations that have achieved little in 18 years, reliance on the United States and holding out the Arab Peace Initiative indefinitely have few cards left to play. As their priority is preservation of their increasingly unpopular regimes, moderates are unlikely to be able to offer any creative initiatives, although it can be expected that among their tactics will be the further demonization of Islamist-led opposition and resistance movements in an attempt to play into Western fears and prejudices.

A notable phenomenon is NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member and spurned EU candidate Turkey's emergence as a regional power apparently more sympathetic to the pro-resistance bloc. In addition to his country's brokering role on behalf of Syria, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered to represent Hamas' interests at the UN during the crisis and issued uncharacteristically harsh condemnations of Israeli behavior and violations of international law. This was in step not only with Arab public opinion, but also with that in Turkey, where hundreds of thousands demonstrated in Istanbul against the Israeli attack. Turkey is not only supplanting a regional role once played by Egypt but, along with Iran, asserting that Western powers are not the only non-Arabs who can intervene in the Arab world.

Enter the Obama Administration

In his first detailed remarks after taking office, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to Middle East peace and appointed the widely-respected Northern Ireland peace broker, former Senator George Mitchell, as his new envoy.

But Obama's basic approach remained unchanged from that of his predecessor. Obama fully accepted the Israeli narrative of its attack on Gaza and reaffirmed that "we will always support Israel's right to defend itself against legitimate threats."[9]

The president reiterated that Hamas must abide by the Quartet conditions to "recognize Israel's right to exist; renounce violence; and abide by past agreements." In effect, Obama expects Hamas to accept Israel's highly controversial and anathema to most Palestinians political demand to be recognized as a "Jewish state," even while Israel is not required to accept any Palestinian rights even those grounded in international law; renounce any Palestinian right to self-defense or resistance while Palestinians are under occupation, blockade and constant Israeli attack; and abide by agreements that Israel has systematically violated without consequence. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal explicitly rejected the Quartet conditions in his 21 January 2009 speech, while reaffirming his movement's willingness to engage in a political process on fair terms.

Obama insisted that reopening Gaza's borders--a fundamental requirement of the Fourth Geneva Conventions and on which Palestinians' lives literally depends--be conditioned on "an appropriate monitoring regime, with the international and Palestinian Authority participating." Specifically, Obama stated that the United States "will support a credible anti-smuggling and interdiction regime, so that Hamas cannot rearm." Obama, like Bush, has accepted the Israeli view that Palestinian violence, rather than Israeli occupation, siege and active colonization and the far more massive Israeli-generated violence these entail, should be the sole focus of U.S. concern.

President Obama reaffirmed the boycott of Hamas and continues to recognize Mahmoud Abbas as PA president. This was confirmed by the State Department spokesman Robert Wood. Although when challenged, Wood could not provide any legal basis for how Abbas' expired term was extended.[10]

The new administration has therefore publicly recommitted to a set of policies that are demonstrated not to work and to exacerbate conflict, violence and political stalemate.

The only bright spot was Mitchell's appointment. His earlier foray to the region produced the 2001 Mitchell Report, which called for a full cessation of all violence by both Israelis and Palestinians, and a complete freeze on Israeli settlement construction. This less biased approach contrasts with now standard U.S. policy of opposing only Palestinian violence while endorsing much more devastating Israeli violence.

Above all, Mitchell brings with him his reputation as the broker of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, which heralded the end of the bloody conflict in Northern Ireland. But that experience demonstrates why the odds are stacked firmly against a similar success in the Middle East.

In Northern Ireland, violence by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), loyalist and other paramilitaries came to be viewed as the symptom of systemic injustice that had to be redressed through an inclusive political process. Moreover, British state-sponsored violence always presented--like Israeli violence--as "self-defense" came to be seen as part of the problem rather than a solution. Previously, demonized parties, such as Sinn Fein, were brought into the process in contrast to the continued exclusion of Hamas. No party was forced a priori to accept its adversaries' political demands or renounce its own. Each was allowed to represent the interests and views of those who elected it, thus producing an agreement that could enjoy broad support.

Finally, the United States used its weight to pressure the British who were the strong side in that conflict and support Irish nationalists, the weaker side. In this sense, the Irish American lobby had a beneficial influence on U.S. policy because it helped level the power imbalance so that negotiations could succeed. The Israel lobby, by contrast, works to push the U.S. to support Israeli intransigence and pressure the vastly weaker Palestinians and will mobilize all its resources to frustrate Mitchell's mission. Indeed, before Mitchell even set foot in the region, a major Israel lobby figure signaled opposition to the new envoy, precisely because he might be "too fair."[11]

This leads to the discouraging conclusion that without the political support and policy framework needed to change an already tried and failed approach, Mitchell's determination and skill are unlikely to make much difference.

Ali Abunimah is a fellow at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC. He is an expert on Palestine, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and is the author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse. Abunimah also co-founded The Electronic Intifada, an online publication about Palestine and the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Electronic Iraq and Electronic Lebanon.

The views expressed in this information brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund.

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[1] See Ali Abunimah, "President Obama and the Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Peace: An Analysis," Palestine Center Information Brief No. 169, 17 November 2008, [http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/3172/pid/223/TPL/InformationBrief/displaytype/raw].
[2] Amnesty International, "Israel used white phosphorus in Gaza civilian areas," 19 January 2009, [http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/israeli-armys-use-white-phosphorus-gaza-clear-undeniable-20090119].
[3] See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Field update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator 22-23 January 2009," [http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_humanitarian_situation_report_2009_01_22_english.pdf].
[4] For a good analysis of events leading up to the attack, see John Mearsheimer, "Another war, another defeat," The American Conservative, 26 January 2009, [http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/jan/26/00006].
[5] See http://www.bdsmovement.net.
[6] Amos Harel, "IDF censor bans naming officers involved in Gaza op," Haaretz, 23 January 2009, [http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057964.html].
[7] See Mouin Rabbani, "Out of the rubble," The National, 23 January 2009, [http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090123/REVIEW/759141570/0/NEWS]; "Can Abbas survive after Gaza war?" Aljazeera.net, 17 January 2009, [http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/01/200911711953774195.html]; and Patrick Cockburn, "Fatah fears Gaza conflict has put Hamas in the ascendancy," The Independent, 23 January 2009, [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/fatah-fears-gaza-conflict-has-put-hamas-in-the-ascendancy-1513430.html]; Robert Fisk, "So far, Obama's missed the point on Gaza," The Independent, 22 January 2009, [http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-so-far-obamas-missed-the-point-on-gaza-1488632.html].
[8] See: "EGYPT: Biting criticism of Doha summit," Los Angeles Times blog, 19 January 2009, [http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/01/egypt-biting-cr.html].
[9] Transcript: "President Obama Delivers Remarks to State Department Employees," The Washington Post, 22 January 2009, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/22/AR2009012202550.html].
[10] See transcript of State Department Daily Press Briefing for 23 January 2009, [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jan/115333.htm].
[11] James Besser, "Mitchell As Envoy Could Split Center," The Jewish Week, 25 January 2009, [http://www.thejewishweek.com/viewArticle/c37_a14675/News/National.html].
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The Palestine Center is an independent think-tank committed to communicating reliable and objective information about the Palestinian political experience to American policy makers, journalists, students and the general public. Established in 1991, it is the educational program of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development.

The Palestine Center brings together people and resources within the American and Palestinian communities to educate about Palestine and the Palestinian peoples ongoing quest for sovereignty on their land, civil and political rights and an end to Israeli occupation. The need for an organization such as The Palestine Center can be found in the effects of the economic, cultural and political oppression Palestinians have endured and which continues on a daily basis in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the surrounding refugee camps and for Palestinians world-wide as they struggle to retain their homeland.

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Dec 22, 2008

Reviving the Arab Peace Initiative: A Way Out of the Impasse?

Palestine Center Information Brief No. 170

By Ali Abunimah
Palestine Center Fellow

In recent weeks, there has been a flurry of renewed interest in the Arab Peace Initiative (API), first formally adopted at the March 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut. Israeli President Shimon Peres, speaking to the U.N. General Assembly on 12 November 2008, touted the initiative as a “serious opening for real progress” in the long-stalled peace process. Ehud Barak, former prime minister, current defense minister and Labor party leader, has also publicly promoted the API in the run-up to Israel’s February general election. Israel’s Foreign Minister and Kadima party leader Tzipi Livni has welcomed the initiative but more cautiously.

In an unprecedented step, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Negotiations Affairs Department (PLO-NAD) placed full-page advertisements promoting the API in Israel’s Hebrew-language newspapers in November. “Fifty-seven Arab and Islamic countries will establish diplomatic ties and normal relations with Israel in return for a full peace agreement and an end to the occupation,” the advertisement’s text began, beneath images of the Palestinian and Israeli flags and bordered by flags of 50 Muslim nations.

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Nov 18, 2008

President Obama and the Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Peace: An Analysis

Palestine Center Information Brief No. 169 (17 November 2008)

By Ali Abunimah
Palestine Center Fellow

President-elect Barack Obama’s election victory has revived hopes that stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations could finally lead to a two-state solution. Few new presidents have been greeted with such optimism and associated high expectations.

However, the chances for progress depend on more than a new American president. There are several interrelated factors: U.S. engagement, the availability of a viable peace agreement, Israeli and Palestinian internal politics and the broader international situation.

An examination of these factors indicates that the optimism is unjustified and that President Obama will not be more successful in bringing about a two-state solution to the conflict. This does not however mean that the situation will remain static or that those pursuing a just peace have no recourse for action.

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Nov 13, 2008

PC Fellow's Op-Ed in Washington Times


ABUNIMAH: Obama's ambiguity

What it reveals about Mideast 'peace'

Ali Abunimah
Thursday, November 13, 2008
Washington Times

Sons are not responsible for the racism of their fathers. But they do have a responsibility to let others know that they disagree vehemently with such sentiments. This is certainly the case for individuals in public service, particularly the man President-elect Barack Obama has chosen as White House chief of staff. Yet, Rep. Rahm Emanuel has not said a word regarding the troubling statement his father made to the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv.

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Oct 15, 2008

BRIEF: Ali Abunimah on Acre (Akka) Clashes

"The Arab-Jewish Clashes in Acre and the Connection to Israel’s Extremist Settlers"
Palestine Center Information Brief No. 167 (15 October 2008)

By Ali Abunimah
Palestine Center Fellow

Acre, a mixed city of approximately 52,000 people in northern Israel, recently witnessed four days of violent clashes between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Israeli Jewish residents. While the facts and meaning of these events have been heavily contested, one of the underreported factors is the extent to which militant Israeli settlers from the West Bank, funded by donors in the United States, have instigated tension in Acre and other cities in an attempt to reduce their Arab populations. This brief will summarize the facts available from public sources and provide background and analysis.

Israeli leaders have presented the events in Acre as unfortunate intercommunal violence in an otherwise peaceful city. Palestinians have perceived them—correctly it would appear—as being related to efforts organized by Jewish extremists to force Arabs out of the city (Palestinians in Israel are citizens of the state and are often also referred to as “Arabs”).

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