Top 10 Wikileaks Palestine Nuggets

UPDATE: Make sure to read latest post on the Wikileaks and the Arab World here.

Wikileaks, the website set up to be a clearinghouse for classified information leaked through secure online channels, has once again published thousands of leaked documents, this time pertaining to American diplomacy around the world. The leaked reports are in the form of "cables" which are diplomatic communications or reports shared between embassies and U.S. diplomatic officials. The origins of the cables vary from different U.S. embassies around the globe to the Department of State in Washington, D.C. While the communications cover relations with many different countries, a significant portion deals with nations in the Middle East.

This post will focus on the most recent leaks as they relate to Palestine, and below are 10 of the more interesting passages relating to Palestine, the Palestinians and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Note that quotes in the text below are from the documents themselves, which may be paraphrased summaries of conversations and are not necessarily verbatim. There is very little here that should come as a surprise to those closely following the international relations of the Middle East and the politics around Palestine. These documents do, however, provide interesting context and color to these relations that were previously unavailable. Since this seems to be the first part of a large document dump by Wikileaks, I will update this post or create another one as the information becomes available.

#1. Qatar's Prime Minister met with Senator John Kerry and discussed a variety of issues including Qatar's views on the Palestinian issue. At the time, the Prime Minister suggested proximity talks which were ongoing between the Israelis and Palestinians would waste time - in his estimate 4-6 months. He also emphasized that negotiations without Hamas are unlikely to be fruitful since the "Palestinian Authority (PA) cannot sign off on an agreement on behalf of the Palestinians where open divisions exist." To no one's surprise, Qatar's PM was not keen on the role Egypt has been playing in the region. Egypt, which has "no end game" in mind when it comes to brokering Hamas-Fatah reconciliation talks, is like a doctor relying on only one patient for business: "the physician is going to keep the patient alive but in the hospital for as long as possible."

#2. Egypt's head of General Intelligence Omar Suleiman would provide little evidence to suggest the Qatari leader's criticism of their biased brokering was untrue. In a conversation with U.S. General Patreaus he stated that "Egypt's three primary objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. " Suleiman also stated that Egypt would continue to be committed to Palestinian reconciliation. "It is hard," he said, "but I am always optimistic. I consider myself a patient man, but I am loosing [sic] patience."

#3. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu met with U.S. Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) just before becoming prime minister again and forming the current Israeli coalition government. When describing "his approach to 'economic peace' with the Palestinians, Netanyahu suggested he would cut through bureaucratic obstacles to Palestinian economic development to build a 'pyramid' from the 'bottom up' that would strengthen the Palestinian Authority, and offer the Palestinians a viable alternative to radicalism." He also indicated he wasn't interested in a sovereign Palestinian state emerging in the West Bank, but rather "an agreement over territory,settlements and 'refined' Palestinian sovereignty without an army or control over air space and borders." Further evidence of Netanyahu's stance, which he states is not unlike Livni's, is described in a cable about a meeting between Netanyahu and a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) in late April 2009. He states "A Palestinian state must be demilitarized, without control over its air space and electro-magnetic field, and without the power to enter into treaties or control its borders. Netanyahu concluded that he and opposition leader Tzipi Livni 'only disagree about the name,' i.e. the two-state solution."

#4. An Israeli assessment of Palestinian leadership: "Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the subject of the Palestinian political situation. It was widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour assessment of Abbas's future. In one exchange, Amos Gilad stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically past the year 2011. Gilad further stated that Abbas is facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas considerably. The Israelis said the perception in the Arab world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk away from him. ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that could be taken to bolster Abbas. Gilad responded by stating that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues -- specifically on the security sector front. Gilad expressed optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing improvements in the security and economic spheres, and further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF) footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for advancing the relationship."

#5. This cable, from a 2007 meeting between U.S. Congressmen and Netanyahu, sheds light on Netanayhu's strategy vis-a-vis Hamas and Fatah: "Netanyahu said Abbas was a 'nice man who means well,' but he added that Israel and the U.S. should focus on 'bringing down Hamas' through an 'economic squeeze'...Netanyahu predicted that Palestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he can deliver the money. He suggested putting in place an 'economic squeeze with an address,' so that Hamas would receive the popular blame."

#6. Israel-PA consultations before Israeli assault on Gaza? According to Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak in this cable: "the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers from both."

#7. Europeans, particularly the French, are not pleased with their role in peace process: "A sense of frustration and ambition informs the French approach toward the Middle East peace process: they are frustrated that they must rely on the USG and on stubborn parties in the region to end a conflict whose persistence adversely affects their national interests, and they are ambitious to play a larger role in the peace process, in order to facilitate a successful outcome and to enjoy the prestige that such a role would earn them. As a case in point, last week Kouchner had to cancel a planned visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories in part because of the continuing tension there, and in part because of Israel's refusal to allow him to visit a French hospital in Gaza."

#8. Germans suggested using Goldstone Reports at UNSC as leverage over Israel's policy of home demolition: "Heusgen said that Germany 'perceives this differently' and thought Netanyahu needed 'to do more' in order bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table. With Palestinians in East Jerusalem getting notices from Israeli authorities that their houses will be destroyed, it would be 'suicide' for President Abbas to move under the current circumstances. Heusgen said he could not fathom why Netanyahu did not understand this. He suggested pressuring Netanyahu by linking favorable UNSC treatment of the Goldstone Report to Israel committing to a complete stop in settlement activity. Gordon said that making a direct linkage between the two would almost certainly be counterproductive, but agreed that it was worth pointing out to the Israelis that their policy on settlements was making it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC. Heusgen said this certainly would be an issue when Netanyahu and 'half of his cabinet' visit Berlin on November 30 for bilateral government consultations."

#9. UAE reaction to Hamas 06 election victory: The UAE 'felt the Muslim Brotherhood rally behind Hamas' after its electoral victory in the Palestinian territories, and that the Hamas victory should be a lesson to the West. UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, 'with some pressure,' would understand the need to respect the will of the international community."

#10. Israel loves cooperation with PA: Amos Gilad "noted that Israeli-PA security and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described Palestinian security forces as the 'good guys.'"

UPDATE:

Bonus #11. French President Sarkozy "called Prime Minister Netanyahu directly on October 26, to urge him to establish an independent investigation into the actions of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza conflict. Sarkozy told Netanyahu that such a step would decrease pressure on Israel and its allies stemming from the Goldstone Report, but Netanyahu responded briskly: "No way." This preceded an Israeli-French strategic dialogue which included significant discussion about the peace process. The French and the Israelis did not see eye to eye and this made an Israeli official to describe "Franco-Israeli discussions on the status of the peace process itself resembled a 'conversation of the deaf'."

UPDATE II:

Bonus #12 Ireland took issue with the US sending weapons to Israel in the past. This cable states that the Irish "Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)" made a "oral but definitive decision during the Lebanon conflict to forbid U.S. military transits carrying munitions to Israel" the cable goes on to cite the "Irish public's overwhelming opposition to Israeli military actions in Lebanon". I wonder what they think after Gaza.

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Neo-Cons and the Hamas-Fateh Split

When I read Aaron David Miller's piece in the Washington Post this week, I could already imagine what the responses would be from the neo-cons and Israel's staunchest defenders. In the piece, among other things, Miller argues that the settlements are not the main obstacle to peacemaking. The internal divisions within the Palestinian polity are going to make it difficult for any Palestinian leader to sign an agreement. There is a lot to be said for this. But for right-wingers, AIPAC-ers and Likudniks, this is a line of argument they treasure and hold dear. What good will pressuring Israel to stop settlements do, the argument goes, if the Palestinians can't get their act together. That is it. The argument ends there. They kick the can down the road and will continue to do so. They will say that settlements are bad but the Palestinians aren't ready for a deal, so why ask the Israelis to stop.

Some fine examples of this are on display by Jeff Goldberg (who wrote the Iran war anthem) and Marty Peretz. Here is Goldberg on this issue (emphasis mine):

It might be a bad idea to bring pressure on Israel on the issue of settlements before negotations [sic] even begin, for the simple reason that the U.S. would like the negotiations to succeed, but they won't have any chance of succeeding if pre-conditions sink them. I'm also suggesting that the entire peace process won't amount to much until the Palestinians resolve their civil war.

Then, here is Peretz referring to the one point he wanted to amplify in Miller piece:

Here's his most significant point: even if Israel and the Palestinian[sic] were to reach agreement on the settlements "negotiations would still confront another galactic challenge: a crisis within the Palestinian national movement, with two authorities governing two discreet areas with two different security services, two different patrons and two different visions of the Palestinian future. The upshot of the battle between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority is that without a monopoly over the forces of violence in Palestinian society -without one authority to silence the guns and rockets- no agreement can be implemented."Almost no one is saying that. But it is not only true. It is virtually a truism.

These are typical responses that we should be prepared to continue seeing from the neo-con community. Note that both writers, and this is typical of these types of arguments, simply introduce Palestinian division as a problem and stop there with little care for understanding the genesis of that problem or what prolongs it.

But isn't Palestinian division a concern? Of course it is. And resolving this issue is an integral part of any negotiated solution. I've talked about the problems of legitimacy in Palestinian leadership and the role of political repression in the division and the intentionally different treatment the US and Israel have had toward the West Bank and Gaza. But those mentioned above and others like them don't want to parse this issue. They would rather use it as a foil to say that efforts to pressure Israel now are a waste of time.

Arguing that Palestinian division is an obstacle to peace only to deflect criticism of Israel's illegal actions and without candidly discussing the reasons behind Palestinian division and the role of the US and Israel in that division, is misleading, dishonest and the purest form of pro-Israel propaganda. It takes the heat off of Israel for its settlement expansion and provides cover for continued expansion for years to come. That's why writers like Goldberg and Peretz won't take the discussion on Palestinian division to its next and logical step. If Palestinian division is a problem, well, define it, understand its causes, suggest solutions.

Perhaps one of the reasons why neo-cons won't discuss solving the problem of Palestinian division is because it highlights the hypocrisy inherent in their ideology - democracy in the Middle East unless people who don't like Israel are elected. Or maybe it's because one of the longest-lasting neo-cons in the Bush administration played a significant role in sparking civil war between Hamas and Fateh. You may recall that it was Elliot "Iran Contra" Abrams who backed sending arms to Fateh in preparation for an overthrow of Hamas in Gaza. That went terribly wrong in June of 2007.

For Israel, a divided Palestinian side is one that it can put off making peace with. That's why it furthers this division time and again, to delay having to make what would be inevitable concessions in a two-state framework. I go into that here and discuss the arrests of Hamas affiliates throughout the West Bank. The problem of political arrests has intensified again as of late, and Khalid Amayreh does a good job of spelling that out here. Surely, the divide-and-conquer-minded Israelis didn't mind hearing this morning's news:

Hamas wing threatens PA leadership

GAZA CITY (Ma'an) -- Hamas' military wing on Wednesday threatened to target Palestinian Authority officials "if PA security forces continue to detain and sue resistance activists in the West Bank."

Al-Qassam Brigades spokesman Abu Ubayda read a statement on behalf of 12 military groups in the Gaza Strip saying "we are fed up with the PA security's behavior in the West Bank. Over the past period, we have preferred to give reconciliation efforts all the time needed, however, we hereby say we will not remain silent for long."

Abu Ubayda said PA forces had "gone to the extremes, forcing us to end our silence," adding that ongoing efforts to secure a unity deal with Fatah "were not enough to prevent chasing and detaining Mujaheddin. Nobody can blame us if we go after leaders of the Fatah-run authority everywhere, and treat them equally."

We also held an event on the United States' role in the divide at the Palestine Center earlier this year. The talk by Nathan Brown, titled "US Foreign Policy and the inter-Palestinian Divide," is available in audio and video formats. Here is the important excerpt from the transcript:

Now, I’ve been talking and mentioning American policy only in the most polite and oblique terms as sort of the international context. Now let me bring that in directly. What has U.S. policy been towards this split? Here, I’m going to drop all diplomacy. I think that essentially it was to promote the split and to maintain it. I don’t think anybody would actually put it quite that way. You go back to the pre-June 2007 period in which there was first a Hamas government and then a national unity government. The United States was very clearly placing its thumb on the scale of insuring that this government not work and that the national unity government not work. The odd thing about this is that there was very little that was secret about this policy. The exact details, what policy instruments the United States was using, was not always completely clear. But even this training of Palestinian security forces under presidential command was a matter of public record. So that when this famous Vanity Fair article that revealed that the United States was going to actively promote a coup came out, what it contributed was lurid prose and a few details and leaked memos, but basically nothing else that wasn’t a more pugnacious version of what had been declared to our policy up to that point.

Since June 2007, since the West Bank and Gaza split, American policy has been West Bank first, as Yousef was reporting at the beginning, essentially, figuring that the divergence in policy performance between the West Bank and the Gaza governments would solve the problem. That allowing some kind of level of security improvements, economic development and/or diplomatic process and the mix of those varies a little bit on the West Bank, and squeezing Gaza hard would make Palestinians come to their senses. That had essentially been American policy. Some of the mechanics of how this was supposed to happen, that is to say that if a Palestinian in Gaza thinks, “Gosh, this government is really bad in Gaza. Let’s get rid of it.” How are they supposed to do this? I think that question was postponed. “Well, tomorrow will be another day.” There’ll be something that’ll make it clear or they’ll be elections and Hamas would be forced to run on a record of poor policy performance forgetting that the split made elections impossible. A new round of elections would not be possible unless there were some West Bank and Gaza reconciliation.

There is plenty of room for serious discussion on the inter-Palestinian divide. Scholars on this issue discuss it candidly, fully recognize the American and neo-con-led role in creating it and suggest ways to end it. But be wary of those arguments that simply conclude on the note that Palestinians are divided, therefore the US should let the Israelis do as they please. The next time you hear the argument that the United States shouldn't pressure Israel because the Palestinians are too divided to make a deal, recognize it immediately for what it is: an excuse for the continued expansion of settlements and the furtherance of Israel's colonialism probably being made by the same people that brought you the Iraq war and want to bring you the Iran war.

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A Two-State Solution Requires Palestinian Politics

The Israeli raid on the flotilla of humanitarian aid headed for Gaza dealt a blow to chances for a breakthrough in the peace process. As the U.S. administration struggles to keep indirect talks alive, Michele Dunne prescribes a different approach in a special paper for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

She writes that it is clear that a two-state solution requires reconciliation between Palestinian factions and reunification of the West Bank and Gaza. Dunne recommends that the United States should support Palestinian institution building and be open to political competition, including elections.

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The West Bank and Gaza: Similar or Different Governance?

Dr. Yezid Sayigh
Professor of Middle East Studies, King's College London

19 March 2010



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How have two distinct systems of government evolved in the West Bank and Gaza? What similarities and differences are there between the two? How have they made institutional improvements and has this effected the balance between security and liberty? How sustainable and vulnerable are these state-like systems given their significant dependence on external capital? Join us for a discussion on these questions and more.

Yezid Sayigh is Professor of Middle East Studies in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. He is currently on leave as a Visiting Scholar at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University. He was an adviser and negotiator in the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks in 1991-1994, and has provided consultancy assistance on Palestinian Authority reform and on the Palestinian-Israeli ‘permanent status’ negotiations since 1998. He is the author of Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, and most recently of Fixing Broken Windows: Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen, Carnegie Paper, October 2009.

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Local Elections in July?

The Palestinian Authority meanwhile said Monday announced it would hold local elections in the West Bank and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip on July 17. “The completion of this democratic process is one of the building blocks of the national authority’s program and the government’s plan to complete the building of the institutions of a state,” the government said in a statement. The last municipal elections were held in 2006 and saw Hamas win a majority in several large towns in both territories.

Hamas rejected the government’s decision. “The illegal government of Fayyad has no right to call for local municipal elections, said Gaza-based Hamas legislature Ismail Al-Ashqar in reference to the PA led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.

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Palestinian Factions Disagree to Agree

The latest disagreement between the leading Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fateh, is over whether the current parliament could continue even though its four-year mandate has expired.

The party's traded accusations, charging each other with undermining Palestinian democracy -- a phrase uttered less frequently these days as compared to four years ago. Their positions are rooted in competing legal claims. Hamas cited the Palestinian Basic Law, which they contend ends a parliament's mandate only when its new members are sworn-in. They asserted the current parliament, which has not convened fully since 2007, should stay in place until new elections are held.

Fateh argued that the Hamas-dominated chamber's four-year term had legally ended. Only President Mahmoud Abbas, Fateh's leader, can call for a parliamentary session, they argued.

To enforce its position, the Palestinian Authority's police forces arrested six Hamas-aligned staff members of the Palestinian Legislative Council's speaker Aziz Dweik, according to another PLC member. The alleged arrests followed a conference given by Dweik, who called on Mahmoud Abbas to support a meeting with all PLC members of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

It is clear the factions are as divided as they have been since Hamas won a landslide victory in parliamentary elections on January 25, 2006. They took 74 of the 132 seats, up-ending Fateh's historic dominance in Palestinian politics. A series of events and American and Israeli pressure, led to the current political rupture in which Hamas forcefully took control of Gaza and Fateh took over the West Bank.

Egyptian mediation has failed to reconcile the parties. They have been unable to agree on a date for new elections, with the latest date of June 28 on the table, giving way to this current disagreement.

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VIDEO: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Inter-Palestinian Divide

Dr. Nathan Brown, a professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, spoke at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC on 14 January 2010 on the United States foreign policy towards Fateh and Hamas in Palestine.

14 January 2010

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TRANSCRIPTS

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Today: US Foreign Policy and the Inter-Palestinian Divide

US Foreign Policy and the Inter-Palestinian Divide

with

Dr. Nathan Brown
Professor of Political Science and International Affairs,
George Washington University

Thursday, 14 January 2009
12:30 - 2:00 p.m.
The Palestine Center
Washington, DC

The talk will be webcast live on this website, starting at 1 PM EST.

Or, RSVP for the event.

Professor Nathan Brown received his B.A. in political science from the University of Chicago and his M.A. and Ph.D. in politics and Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University. He teaches courses on Middle Eastern politics, as well as more general courses on comparative politics and international relations.

He is author of Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt (1990); The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf (1997); Constitutions in a Non-Constitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government (2001); and Palestinian Politics After the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine (2003).

In 2009 he was selected as a Carnegie Scholar by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Under this grant, Professor Brown will analyze the impacts of increased participation by Islamist groups in electoral politics on both the movements themselves and the political systems in which they operate.

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Palestinian Group Opposes Repression in Gaza

A leading Palestinian human rights group criticized the Gazan security services for repressing Fatah activists.

The Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) condemns measures taken by the security services in Gaza against activists of Fatah Movement in the Gaza Strip to prevent them from commemorating the 45th anniversary of the establishment on the movement on the 1st of January. Security services in Gaza arrested dozens of activists of Fatah movement during the last week of December 2009. A number of detainees were violently beaten and were subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. Security services also prevented private celebrations in closed places, took down flags of Fatah Movement from houses and summoned a number of people who flamed candles. The most serious of such violations was the death of Nazira al-Swairki, from Gaza City, when she was being transported in a police vehicle to a detention center.

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BRIEF: A Tale of Two Cities...in Palestine

Palestine Center Brief No. 189 (5 January 2010)

By Yousef Munayyer

While most would point out the differences between Gaza City, the impoverished and destitute administrative center of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip, and Ramallah, the burgeoning administrative center of the Fateh-run West Bank, there are important commonalities between what seem to be diametrically opposite poles.

A common misconception, which has gained considerable attention as of late, is that management or governing styles of different parties are responsible for the stark differences in the realities on the ground. This certainly plays into the narrative that we often hear emanating from Washington about engaging one Palestinian party and not the other. However, the fact of the matter is that the most important thing both Palestinian locales have in common is the underlying reason for their differences: the role of external factors in their economic conditions.

Gaza City, the largest city in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, is home to about 400,000 Palestinians. The densely populated strip of land that surrounds the city and takes its name, is home to over 1.5 million Palestinians. Eighty percent of the inhabitants of Gaza are refugees and a similar number rely directly on food aid for daily sustenance. While this number has historically been high since the creation of the refugees by the state of Israel in 1948, it has never been that high.

The plight of Palestinians in Gaza has been exacerbated in recent years due to Israeli restrictions on the Strip. This began after the election of a Hamas government in the Palestinian Legislative Elections in 2006 and accelerated in 2007. The immediate Israeli and international response was to cut off funds to the Palestinian Authority (PA). International players dried up aid and the state of Israel froze Palestinian tax revenue, preventing it from reaching the Palestinian governing body.

Imports and exports were likewise severely curtailed because of the siege. The Palestinian National Trade and Development Organization, PalTrade, reported that "imports into and exports from the Gaza Strip before the closure in 2007 reached a monthly average of 10,400 and 1,380 truckloads, respectively. This declined to about 2,834 truckloads of imports and no exports after the recent military operations. Immediately after the operations, there was only one isolated instance in which exports of flowers were allowed from the Gaza Strip in March 2009. Some 134 truckloads of cash crops were exported in total between June 2007 and May 2009."

As the siege tightened, we began to see more dramatic numbers and facts reported by a wide range of international organizations and NGOs. In 2007, the International Committee of the Red Cross called on Israel to "lift the retaliatory measures which are paralyzing life in Gaza". In 2008, Amnesty International reported that "Gaza's fragile economy, already battered by years of restrictions and destruction, has collapsed. …some 90 percent of industry has shut down."

Then the brutal 22-day campaign termed "Cast Lead", which required hearts of cold steel to perpetuate, further decimated Gaza. Along with the significant number of Palestinians killed, over 1,400 most of whom were civilians, the attacks leveled a devastating blow to an economy that was already in tatters. The attacks partially or completely destroyed 700 private sector establishments.

In 2005, for example, the furniture, garment and processed food industries in Gaza employed 6,500, 25,000 and 2,500 people respectively and included 600, 660, and 100 businesses respectively. After "Cast Lead," the employment figures dropped to 70,110 and 144, while the number of businesses dropped to 26, 10, and 16. Exports from these industries which were all triple-digit numbers in 2005 dropped to zeros across the board after last winter's attacks.

Yet just as Gaza's economic woes can be credited to the Israeli siege and the destruction levied during "Cast Lead," Ramallah is also indebted to external factors for its apparent successes.

Today, Ramallah has become known for its bars, nightclubs and cosmopolitan feel. Internationals and locals, working for outfits funded by hordes of donor dollars (many from the U.S.), are pouring the shekels they earn into nights on the town.

It wasn't always like this in Ramallah. Just a few years ago, after Hamas was elected to the PA, Palestinian civil servants, teachers and bureaucrats in the West Bank and Gaza were equally out of luck and out of money, as Washington-led sanctions prevented the PA from meeting payroll for months on end. Things started to change in mid-2007, however, when the Hamas-led PA dissolved and Fateh took control of the PA's institutions in the West Bank.

In mid-2007, to “avert a serious and immediate financial crisis” President Bush wanted to send funds to the now Fatah-led PA, but he needed to assure Congressional hawks that the funds would not end up used for violence or in the hands of Hamas or lining the pockets of officials often blamed for corruption. A trusted caretaker was needed and one with an accounting background was preferred.

Enter Salam Fayyad. The western educated former World Bank and IMF man, with no discernible political experience, took over as the newly appointed Prime Minister of the PA. In Washington, few things say “passivity” like a clean-shaven be-speckled accountant. Presidential waivers began to be issued to circumvent the sanctions levied against the PA by AIPAC-sponsored Congressional legislation . Every 6-months, a waiver; every 6-months an injection of funds to the new PA based in Ramallah, and till today President Obama continues this trend. Every donor dollar coming into the PA goes through Ramallah, and Ramallah, more than any other town in the West Bank, has felt the effects of this.

But despite the growth that donor dollars have produced, one can't help but notice how artificial the growth is. Economic studies on this issue tend to come up with the same conclusions. Yes, there has been growth in the West Bank, but (and this is a big but) that growth is due largely to an economy kept afloat by donor dollars and a relaxation of Israeli closures.

A recent IMF report indicates that expenditures in the PA budget for 2010 is $2.9 billion, $1.9 billion of which would not be covered by domestic revenue and would be financed by external support. The report also states that there has been an increase of 6 percent in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the first quarter of 2009 as compared to the first quarter in 2008.

In the U.S., many have clung to bits and pieces of reports like this, and declared victory for the policy of propping up one Palestinian party and sidelining the other. Headlines of articles on the issue declare unprecedented economic growth. Realistically, however, this would be like declaring unprecedented drops, from the previous year, in the number of homeless in New Orleans two years after Hurricane Katrina. Without controlling for the drastic conditions that existed beforehand, it's hard to call this growth. Years of occupation, restrictions, closure and high unemployment have left Palestinians below zero. But I guess going from negative 20 to negative 15 is still growth.

A finer reading of the economic reports reveals the truth behind the numbers in the West Bank. Assumptions of future growth are based on "a continuation of the process of lifting restrictions on movement in the West Bank and the blockade on Gaza".

Perhaps the bias in reporting on the economic realities is in part based on a western desire to have their 'secular' partner in Palestine succeed. Washington is, after all, more likely to cooperate with the pole where one can make time for happy hour, than the one where the most important time is the call to prayer.

Yet, regardless to the perceptions from Washington, Ramallah, Gaza or elsewhere about the parties involved, the reality is that both administrative centers are not in control of their destinies. Rather, what happens to the people of Palestine today, as in the past, remains in the hands of others.

In sum, the successes or failures of both Gaza and Ramallah, like all occupied Palestinian locales, are overwhelmingly determined by Israeli or American actions and intentions and not the actions of the respective regimes. This is not to absolve Hamas or Fateh of their responsibilities to the people they govern, but rather this puts their apparent successes and failures in the proper context: that is, the context of an ongoing illegal Israeli occupation that ultimately has more control over the daily lives of Palestinians than any of their representatives.

Yousef Munayyer is Executive Director of the Palestine Center. This policy brief may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Center.

The views in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund.

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Mixed Signals on Israel-Hamas Prisoner Swap

There has been a rise in recent speculation that a prisoner swap between Hamas and Israel is going to happen soon.

Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Israel's industry and trade minister, told Israeli Army radio, "I am very happy that this deal is moving toward completion in the very near future." Ben-Eliezer, an ex-general, is not a member of the inner security cabinet deliberating over the prisoner swap.

After President Shimon Peres held talks with his Egyptian counterpart Hosni Mubarak in Cairo on Sunday, he spoke of "real progress" in the negotiations.

On the other side, Hamas delegations were in Cairo talking to Egyptian intelligence and are said to be heading for Damascus to consult the exiled political leadership -- giving further fuel for the speculation.

However, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said today an Israeli prisoner exchange with Hamas has not yet been agreed and might not happen.

"There is still no deal, and I do not know if there will be one."

While many hope for a deal soon, Netanyahu indicated more process is necessary: "Should there be such (a swap) we will not be sparing with a public discussion. We will not do it as a fait accompli. We will allow the cabinet ministers, and the public in general, to discuss the issue."

Hamas accused Israel of stirring up such speculation in a bid to generate Palestinian popular pressure on the movement to speed up a deal.

A Hamas statement said:

The brouhaha in the media talking about being close to reach an agreement on prisoner exchange deal is purely Israeli leaks designed to influence the feelings of our children, prisoners and their families and to try to pressure and influence on the process of indirect negotiations carried out through the German intermediary. Hamas will continue its efforts through the competent authority to overcome the obstacles set by the Israeli enemy in the way of completion of exchange … Although we hope to reach an honorable deal for our people as soon as possible, would like to emphasize that it is premature to talk about specific results … or close a deal.

It could be a bargaining move since there is likely disagreement between the two parties about releasing certain individuals.

The release of prisoners is a very important issue for Palestinians. Nearly 11,000 are held in Israeli jails.

Hamas would gain from such a swap; it would boost its credibility and legitimacy. The Guardian suggests:

Israel is likely to try to lessen the impact of that by also freeing prisoners from the mainstream Fatah movement, which has been badly weakened by the failure to make any progress in peace talks and the threat by Mahmoud Abbas, the Fatah leader and Palestinian president, to leave the political stage.

Israel tends to hold so many Palestinians that prisoner swaps tend to be disproportionate. In 1985 Israel freed 1,150 prisoners in exchange for three soldiers captured during the Lebanon war.

In early October Israel released 20 Palestinian female prisoners in exchange for a minute-long "proof of life" tape video of Gilad Shalit.

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A Palestinian Referendum on Statehood the Best Step Forward?

A political crisis in Palestine has taken shape and has inspired some interesting re-thinking about how to achieve Palestinian independence. Unfortunately, without clarity in the political direction, there are not many good choices. One idea, raised recently, is to hold a popular referendum on Palestinian independence.

First, an overview of the political crisis. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas postponed the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for January and confirmed that he will not run for the office. This comes at a time where his domestic and constitutional legitimacy as president is being widely questioned.

There has also been talk of dissolving the Palestinian Authority, as well, which certainly fits with the postponement of elections and Abbas's statement not to run. Constitutionally, failure to conduct elections by January 24, 2010 would mean that the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, a Hamas member, would assume the role. Obviously, neither Abbas, the US or Israel have publicly endorse that outcome.

That could leave the PLO, which Abbas is chairman of, as the main broker to assume control of the quasi-governing structures. It would get the leadership out of PA obligations, supposedly, and let them keep political representation in place; it could also serve their interests in their feud with Hamas.

Finally, they raised the threat of another unilateral declaration of independence (already tried that in 1988). How to pull that off with the rest of the political uncertainty seems implausible, and support from the world powers has not been forthcoming. Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt, whose country holds the EU presidency, told reporters "the conditions are not there as of yet." Some, such as Virginia Tilley, have noted the risks of such a move.

One idea for moving toward this aim is a popular referendum on the question. It would give it more legitimacy internationally. This was proposed by Victor Kattan in a piece published on the Guardian's website:

Rather than acting hastily and haphazardly, the best thing the PA could do if it is really intent on issuing a declaration of independence would be to consider holding a referendum along the lines recommended by the Badinter Arbitration Commission as regards the former Yugoslav republics. Of course, they would have to co-ordinate the logistics of such a referendum with Hamas. The one major advantage that the Palestinians have which differentiates their case from Kosovo is self-determination. As a people subject to an earlier type of colonial rule in the form of a mandate, the Palestinians are entitled to external self-determination. In their quest for independence they are entitled to seek support from the international community.

He discusses how it could function as an effective tactic within the general UDI plan.

It would be politically difficult and hypocritical for Europe and the US to reject the popular will of the Palestinian people for a second time as they did when they opposed the outcome of the 2006 legislative elections. And even if they did oppose it, or if Israel placed obstacles in the way of holding a referendum, the PA would then have the necessary impetus and international support from the developing nations and the non-aligned movement to seek a majority vote in the UN general assembly for an authoritative advisory opinion from the international court of justice. In this regard an appropriate question for that court to consider might be the lawfulness of Israel's prolonged military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the implications this has for Palestinian statehood.

Something clearly needs to be done as Israeli settlements expand, Jerusalem gets squeezed off, and Gaza dissipates. There can be no credible declaration of statehood without political unity or a clear mandate. A referendum would add to that, albeit only one part: the mandate. Kattan argues correctly the vote would need to be worked out with Hamas. In terms of implementing this tactic, that is true. But to make use of it politically, the lack of political unity, with the cooperative, coordinated action it entails, would be fatal.

Unity is vital to the national project. It can only accomplished through war or compromise; the current dynamic towards territorial secession with mutual factional repression clearly undermines the development of a "nation."

This overall shuffling about -- from the postponement of elections to the contemplation of declaring independence -- indicates that banking on the Obama administration was a distinct failure. The promises of change President Obama announced in Cairo soon gave way to deference for the Israeli position.

Now, the Palestinian leadership is trying to find a way out of their failed hopes in American foreign policy. Long unwilling to parlay international sympathies or build international solidarity on the ground, the Palestinian leadership is now left with no clear way forward.

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The Cyclical Nature of Israeli Airstrikes in Gaza

[Image from Maan News Agency]

Earlier today, there were Israeli airstrikes near Rafah and in the Khan Younis area of the Gaza Strip.

An Israeli military spokesperson said the strikes targeted a “weapons manufacturing facility in the southern Gaza Strip and two smuggling tunnels in the Rafah border area.”

Officials of the Palestinian group Hamas said two other strikes hit a military training facility close to Khan Younis in the central Gaza Strip.

There is not clarity about the number of injuries. Some reports say the attacks injured three Palestinians, according to medical sources. However, medics at Abu Yousef An-Najjar Hospital in Rafah, and the larger Nasser Hospital in the city of Khan Younis said that no one was injured in the attacks, according to Maan News Agency.

The attacks followed the launch of a rocket from Gaza into the western Negev desert on Wednesday morning. The rocket hit no one. The Qassam rocket attack came hours after Israeli forces killed and 18-year-old Palestinian.

The teenager was among a group of young men seen near the border wall between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces said they had been planting an explosive device, but family members said the group had been hunting birds, local media reported.

Overall, there has been a decline in rocket attacks from Gaza. An Israeli general pointed out that Hamas was curbing Gaza rocket fire.

"For now, at least, I can say that the Hamas movement is holding back, and is holding back the others," Lieutenant-General Gabi Ashkenazi said in a speech last week in the southern Israeli town of Beersheba. "Now and then, here and there, there is firing, but overall the situation is quiet."

Why then did Israel bomb a facility said to be operated by Hamas’ armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades?

The rocket attacks may be carried out then by groups seeking to weaken Hamas's rule in Gaza. However, Israel then struck back at Hamas in order to foment more internal strife. Hamas, seeking to legitimize its rule, is happy to use these attacks to cement its control in Gaza. Everyone wins in this tactical cycle -- except the people.

Of course, such low-level violence can easily turn to higher levels of brinkmanship and then full military engagements. It is important to remember that one year ago, in the lead up to Israel's devastating three-week assault on Gaza, Israel escalated their attacks to effectively end the ceasefire and create the pretext for the invasion. Like now, Hamas was trying to demonstrate its rule by curbing rocket-fire. Israel's provocation took place on November 4, 2008: Israel attacked a Hamas-dug tunnel near the Israel-Gaza border, killing six Hamas fighters. Hamas rocket-fire resumed the following day, as they launched thirty-five. Israel later used this as a reason to reject a return to the cease-fire.

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Does Fateh Have the Audacity to Lose Hope in Obama?

A memo circulating among members of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' political party states that all hopes placed in the Obama administration "have evaporated." It cites White House backtracking on key issues.

The Fateh Party document, obtained by The Associated Press, accuses the United States of backing off from its demands that Israel freeze settlement construction and failing to set a clear agenda for new Mideast peace talks.

It it not clear whether the document reflects Abbas' views or was intended to be leaked as an attempt to pressure President Barack Obama to bear down harder on Israel.

The memo comes after protests within Fateh over Abbas' short-lived decision to suspend efforts to push the UN Human Rights Council's Goldstone Report, which was highly critical of Israel's invasion in the Gaza Strip last winter.

Internally, the Palestinians are divided. Reconciliation talks between Fateh, which controls the West Bank, and the Islamic militant Hamas group that rules Gaza, are still inconclusive despite recent developments.

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VIDEO: Moving Forward: Palestinian Political Parties & Reconciliation

Download as mp3

Nadia Bilbassy-Charters
Middle East Broadcasting Corporation.

Palestine Center
Washington, DC

This lecture discussed the current efforts by Fateh, Hamas and other Palestinian parties to reach a national reconciliation and possible unity government. She highlighted the major points of contention and disagreement and the prospects for success.

Nadia Bilbassy-Charters is the chief news correspondent for the Middle East Broadcasting Center in Washington, D.C. where she covers the White House and the State Department. On MBC, she has a weekly popular segment which deals with feature stories about America to the Arab world. For almost 20 years, Ms. Bilbassy covered regions of the world including Africa, Asia, Europe and the U.S. She has interviewed high profile world leaders including former President George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Yasser Arafat, Nelson Mandela, Queen Noor and others.

This is the first lecture in the Summer Intern Lecture Series.

Views expressed on this post or on linked web pages do not represent the Palestine Center, the educational program of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development. All content is for educational purposes only.

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Israel carries out incursions in six West Bank towns overnight

Israel reneges on week-old pact to limit West Bank incursions

A week after promising to end incursions into four West Bank cities and allow the Palestinian Authority’s security services to assume around the clock control in those towns, the Israeli army carried out incursions and raids in Hebron, Nablus, Qalqilia, and Bethlehem and Jenin.

Last week, in a meeting with Palestinian counterparts, the Israeli army promised to end incursions into Jericho, Qalqilia, Ramallah and Bethlehem unless there was an immediate danger to Israeli interests. At the time, officials within the PA’s security establishment cast serious doubts on the seriousness of the Israeli promise, and maintained that it would do little to change the reality of occupation in the West Bank. Israel will maintain that last night’s incursions into Bethlehem and Qalqilia were necessary and therefore not a breach of the promise made to the PA.

According to Palestinian sources, at least six Palestinians were detained during the raids, three as they were driving through Hebron.

The agreement to limit military incursions in the four Palestinian towns was widely seen as a reward for the Palestinian Authority’s heavy crackdown on Hamas affiliates throughout the West Bank, the culmination of which was a series of deadly gunbattles in Qalqilia three weeks ago. The PA’s security services are currently being trained by US general Keith Dayton, who says that the Israelis are committed to handing over security control of Palestinian towns as soon as possible. However, the PA laments the Israeli-imposed limits on equipment and movement which it says makes it hard for its forces to impose security control in those towns.



Views expressed on this post or on linked web pages do not represent the Palestine Center, the educational program of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development. All content is for educational purposes only.

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Hamas Withdraws from Conciliation Committee talks

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas announced the impending release of all Hamas members from PA jails. However, Hamas’ West Bank representatives to the Conciliation Committee announced the party’s withdrawal from the committee to protest what they said was Fateh’s refusal to release the prisoners.

At the same time Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum released a list of 64 Hamas affiliates arrested by the Palestinian Authority overnight.

Dr Omar Abdul Raziq, Hamas’ delegate to the committee, accused his Fateh counterparts of trying to pass off the responsibility for the arrests to caretaker Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, "despite the fact that the government is controlled by Abbas who is the general commander of Fateh."

The Conciliation Committee was set up on the back of the national unity talks that aim to bring together the main Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, after two years of division. The split was sparked by Hamas’ 2006 legislative election victory. The ensuing power struggle and subsequent internal violence led to Fateh being routed in the Gaza Strip and its heavy crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank.

The talks are being brokered by Egypt.

The withdrawal will be the latest in a series of impediments that have been dogging the talks, with the topic of political prisoners held by either side being an especially thorny issue. The PA has promised to release its prisoners in the past, and Hamas has used the issue as a basis for boycotting previous rounds of dialogue. However, such boycotts tend to be acts of temporary protest, with both sides expected to return to the table soon.

Views expressed on this post or on linked web pages do not represent the Palestine Center, the educational program of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development. All content is for educational purposes only.

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From Gaza to Obama: What Next for the Middle East?

Palestine Center Brief No. 174 (27 January 2009)

Information Brief

By Ali Abunimah
Palestine Center Fellow

Introduction

Israel's attack on the occupied Gaza Strip caused massive death and destruction. It has also profoundly changed the regional political landscape, calling for a deep reassessment of U.S. policy. It is into this perilous situation that U.S. President Barack Obama steps. Early moves, entirely consistent with statements during the campaign, indicate that the necessary reassessment will not soon be forthcoming.[1] Hence, despite the appointment of the well-respected and highly-experienced former U.S. Senator George Mitchell as envoy, the region should brace itself for enduring political stalemate and escalating violence.

Scorched Earth

Beginning on 27 December 2008, Israel bombarded the Gaza Strip by land, sea and air for 22 days. UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes echoed statements from Palestinians and international witnesses when he called the devastation in the coastal territory that is home to 1.5 million Palestinians "extremely shocking."

Amnesty International found "indisputable evidence" that Israel had indiscriminately used white phosphorus--that causes horrific injuries and death--in civilian areas.[2] There have been numerous allegations of other war crimes and atrocities, including summary executions of civilians, denial of medical care to the injured, the targeting of ambulances, medical personnel, UN facilities where civilians had sought shelter, as well as systematic targeting of private homes, police stations, universities, mosques, fishing boats, factories and workshops, government buildings and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).

In just three weeks, Israel killed more Palestinians in Gaza--at least 1,300--than in any previous year since it began its violence crackdown on the second intifada in 2000. Among the dead were 412 children and 110 women, according to health officials. Although large numbers of male civilians, including dozens of civilian police officers, were killed, exact numbers have not been reported. Among the 5,300 injured, 1,855 were children and 795 were women.[3] Thirteen Israelis, ten of them Israeli soldiers, also died. Preliminary estimates put the number of homes completely destroyed at more than 4,000 with 17,000 damaged. Tens of thousands are displaced or without shelter.

The enormous physical and psychological cost of Israel's attack, particularly on children, has yet to be fully calculated, and its consequences will be deep and lasting on a society that had already suffered from 61 years of dispossession, 41 years of military occupation and almost two years of total blockade.

Israel Lost Much More than It Gained

Israel's pretext for the Gaza attack--accepted by the United States and other western governments--was to stop indiscriminate rocket fire by Hamas from Gaza. It is indisputable, and Israel has acknowledged that Hamas did not fire any rockets at Israel from the moment a truce deal was reached on 19 June 2008 until after 4 November 2008, when rocket fire resumed. Israel had also acknowledged that Hamas moved to prevent other factions that fired about two dozen rockets over that four-month period from breaking the truce. Hamas resumed rocket fire only after Israel carried out a 4 November 2008 attack on Gaza that killed six Palestinians. Hamas allowed the already collapsed truce to formally lapse without renewal on 19 December 2008 primarily because Israel had refused to loosen the crippling blockade of Gaza or halt its armed attacks that had killed dozens of Palestinians during the truce.[4]

Although it wanted to prevent rocket fire, Israel's primary goals were to restore "deterrence" lost in its 2006 Lebanon debacle and to fatally weaken Hamas and rob it of political support. It achieved none of these goals; Hamas and other resistance groups still had rocket launching capability even after Israel declared a ceasefire. Hamas did not collapse as a military or political organization and retained the mass support without which a guerilla organization cannot function. Having survived an all-out assault from the Israeli war machine, Hamas emerged with significantly enhanced prestige among Palestinians and Arab public opinion, just as Hizballah did from its 2006 war with Israel.

In order to consolidate this support, Hamas will have to show that it can competently manage the aftermath, including assistance to the families' victims. Hamas leaders in Damascus and Gaza have already announced plans to distribute financial compensation and rebuild, again following precedents set by Hizballah.

Israel's Jewish citizens overwhelmingly supported the attack on Gaza and celebrated tactical "victories"--essentially their ability to inflict enormous pain and damage. With time, Israelis may begin to recognize that as in Lebanon they have suffered another strategic defeat: Israeli military power cannot cow entire populations into submission and cannot remake the politics of the region to reflect Israeli preferences. This lesson should have been learned after Israel's disastrous 1982 invasion of Lebanon but has yet to be absorbed by Israeli elites.

In addition to military power, Israel relies on Western support to maintain regional dominance. This pillar is starting to weaken as a consequence of Gaza; despite solid support from Western governments, Israel faced unprecedented waves of outrage from global public opinion and civil society as expressed in press commentary, enormous demonstrations and other mass actions. Israel's official hasbara (state propaganda) machinery was unable to suppress these mobilizations. One consequence is likely to be the mainstreaming of support for the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement, modeled on the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s, to force Israel to comply with international law.[5]

There have been unprecedented calls from international jurists, civil society organizations, UN officials, legislators and others for Israel to be held accountable. Israel is concerned enough that its officials and military officers may face war crimes charges that it has taken active countermeasures, such as tightening official censorship of accounts of actions taken by its army in Gaza and even on publishing the names of soldiers involved and offering legal support.[6]

For decades, Israel nurtured a narrative persuasive in the West that its creation, maintenance and conduct were the morally righteous legacy of the Nazi Holocaust. The long-term viability of this narrative as a means to mobilize political support and suppress criticism has been badly if not irrevocably degraded by Israel's actions in Gaza.

The Palestinian Authority and the Arab "Moderates" Lose Out

As part of the "War on Terror," the Bush administration divided a vast swathe of the planet from Morocco to Pakistan between so-called "moderates," on the one hand, and "extremists" on the other. A moderate is any actor that is in a patron-client relationship with the United States. In the Arab region, this group includes Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Lebanese government of Fouad Siniora (up to May 2008) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) headed by Mahmoud Abbas. An extremist, in this scheme, is any actor that opposes or resists U.S. hegemony in the region.

The labels, "moderate" and "extremist," clearly imply value judgments and were created to obscure underlying power relations and interests. They have nothing to do with democracy or Islamism; the most "moderate" regimes from the U.S. perspective are often the most undemocratic, repressive or theocratic (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, PA). Whereas, "extremists" may have received popular mandates at contested elections (Hamas, Hizballah, Iran) or be secular (Syria). What is at stake is America's ability to shore up a regional order it dominates, but that is coming apart at the seams. If the Gaza attack was supposed to tip the balance in favor of the moderates, it backfired even more spectacularly than Israel's war against Lebanon in 2006.

Among Palestinians, it is now conventional (though certainly not universal) to view Abbas, whose official term as PA president expired on 9 January 2009, as having zero legitimacy and credibility. Large segments of Palestinian public opinion view Abbas and his government headed by Salam Fayyad as irrelevant.[7] Hamas--through its own successes and survival and because there is no viable alternative--has effectively emerged as the closest thing Palestinians have to a national leadership. That is probably not a position Hamas can or wants to sustain, and there remains a pressing need for Palestinians themselves to create representative and inclusive bodies to guide the national movement.

Before Gaza, Hamas sought reconciliation while Abbas' leadership continued to impose U.S.-dictated conditions that Hamas would never meet. Now, as they feel their support draining away, some voices in Ramallah are calling for reconciliation on almost any terms. Others are opportunistically attempting to persuade Arab and international donors to channel desperately needed humanitarian aid for Gaza through Abbas in order to revive a dead political body.

In a 21 January 2009 "victory" speech broadcast live on Al Jazeera, Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal set out his movement's new terms for reconciliation: the PA would have to abandon "security cooperation" with Israel, release political prisoners and support and recognize resistance not "silly negotiations" (a mocking reference to Abbas" dismissal of Hamas' "silly rockets") as the foundation of a national program. Even as the PA becomes irrelevant, there are few signs it is capable of making such compromises that would jeopardize its last existing base of support, "the international community," and the Israeli government.

Thus, the Palestinians are entering a period, similar to the 1970s, where only credible leadership is isolated and scorned by Israel and its Western backers who continue to try to prop up or nurture pliable clients.

Arab Regimes More Divided than Ever over Israel, U.S.

The divisions between moderates and those resisting U.S. hegemony broke into open confrontation during the Gaza crisis, with the two blocs convening rival summits. The moderates, particularly Egypt, undoubtedly lost the political and public opinion battle. Throughout the region, there were unprecedented accusations of collusion with Israel directed at Egypt, which failed to mount an effective public defense.

Moderates boycotted an informal Arab summit convened by Qatar on 16 January 2009. Reflecting an official strategy of demonizing Iran, one of Egypt's official newspapers dismissed the Doha summit as "Persian" rather than "Arab."[8] Nevertheless, the PA's absence left the floor to Hamas to represent Palestinians, further enhancing the latter's status. Qatar, which hosts a major U.S. military base, and Mauritania cut off all ties with Israel. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pronounced the Arab Peace Initiative dead and suspended indirect Turkish-brokered peace talks with Israel.

Despite attempts to patch over differences at a 19 June 2008 meeting in Kuwait, Arab leaders remain deeply divided over relations with the United States and how to deal with Israel. Hamas' ability to deny Israel any strategic achievement in Gaza--like Hizballah's success in 2006--reinforced and expanded the constituency arguing that resistance is a viable option, and that without the power-balancing effects of resistance, no negotiations can achieve meaningful results. The moderates', supporting open-ended negotiations that have achieved little in 18 years, reliance on the United States and holding out the Arab Peace Initiative indefinitely have few cards left to play. As their priority is preservation of their increasingly unpopular regimes, moderates are unlikely to be able to offer any creative initiatives, although it can be expected that among their tactics will be the further demonization of Islamist-led opposition and resistance movements in an attempt to play into Western fears and prejudices.

A notable phenomenon is NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member and spurned EU candidate Turkey's emergence as a regional power apparently more sympathetic to the pro-resistance bloc. In addition to his country's brokering role on behalf of Syria, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered to represent Hamas' interests at the UN during the crisis and issued uncharacteristically harsh condemnations of Israeli behavior and violations of international law. This was in step not only with Arab public opinion, but also with that in Turkey, where hundreds of thousands demonstrated in Istanbul against the Israeli attack. Turkey is not only supplanting a regional role once played by Egypt but, along with Iran, asserting that Western powers are not the only non-Arabs who can intervene in the Arab world.

Enter the Obama Administration

In his first detailed remarks after taking office, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to Middle East peace and appointed the widely-respected Northern Ireland peace broker, former Senator George Mitchell, as his new envoy.

But Obama's basic approach remained unchanged from that of his predecessor. Obama fully accepted the Israeli narrative of its attack on Gaza and reaffirmed that "we will always support Israel's right to defend itself against legitimate threats."[9]

The president reiterated that Hamas must abide by the Quartet conditions to "recognize Israel's right to exist; renounce violence; and abide by past agreements." In effect, Obama expects Hamas to accept Israel's highly controversial and anathema to most Palestinians political demand to be recognized as a "Jewish state," even while Israel is not required to accept any Palestinian rights even those grounded in international law; renounce any Palestinian right to self-defense or resistance while Palestinians are under occupation, blockade and constant Israeli attack; and abide by agreements that Israel has systematically violated without consequence. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal explicitly rejected the Quartet conditions in his 21 January 2009 speech, while reaffirming his movement's willingness to engage in a political process on fair terms.

Obama insisted that reopening Gaza's borders--a fundamental requirement of the Fourth Geneva Conventions and on which Palestinians' lives literally depends--be conditioned on "an appropriate monitoring regime, with the international and Palestinian Authority participating." Specifically, Obama stated that the United States "will support a credible anti-smuggling and interdiction regime, so that Hamas cannot rearm." Obama, like Bush, has accepted the Israeli view that Palestinian violence, rather than Israeli occupation, siege and active colonization and the far more massive Israeli-generated violence these entail, should be the sole focus of U.S. concern.

President Obama reaffirmed the boycott of Hamas and continues to recognize Mahmoud Abbas as PA president. This was confirmed by the State Department spokesman Robert Wood. Although when challenged, Wood could not provide any legal basis for how Abbas' expired term was extended.[10]

The new administration has therefore publicly recommitted to a set of policies that are demonstrated not to work and to exacerbate conflict, violence and political stalemate.

The only bright spot was Mitchell's appointment. His earlier foray to the region produced the 2001 Mitchell Report, which called for a full cessation of all violence by both Israelis and Palestinians, and a complete freeze on Israeli settlement construction. This less biased approach contrasts with now standard U.S. policy of opposing only Palestinian violence while endorsing much more devastating Israeli violence.

Above all, Mitchell brings with him his reputation as the broker of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, which heralded the end of the bloody conflict in Northern Ireland. But that experience demonstrates why the odds are stacked firmly against a similar success in the Middle East.

In Northern Ireland, violence by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), loyalist and other paramilitaries came to be viewed as the symptom of systemic injustice that had to be redressed through an inclusive political process. Moreover, British state-sponsored violence always presented--like Israeli violence--as "self-defense" came to be seen as part of the problem rather than a solution. Previously, demonized parties, such as Sinn Fein, were brought into the process in contrast to the continued exclusion of Hamas. No party was forced a priori to accept its adversaries' political demands or renounce its own. Each was allowed to represent the interests and views of those who elected it, thus producing an agreement that could enjoy broad support.

Finally, the United States used its weight to pressure the British who were the strong side in that conflict and support Irish nationalists, the weaker side. In this sense, the Irish American lobby had a beneficial influence on U.S. policy because it helped level the power imbalance so that negotiations could succeed. The Israel lobby, by contrast, works to push the U.S. to support Israeli intransigence and pressure the vastly weaker Palestinians and will mobilize all its resources to frustrate Mitchell's mission. Indeed, before Mitchell even set foot in the region, a major Israel lobby figure signaled opposition to the new envoy, precisely because he might be "too fair."[11]

This leads to the discouraging conclusion that without the political support and policy framework needed to change an already tried and failed approach, Mitchell's determination and skill are unlikely to make much difference.

Ali Abunimah is a fellow at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC. He is an expert on Palestine, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and is the author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse. Abunimah also co-founded The Electronic Intifada, an online publication about Palestine and the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Electronic Iraq and Electronic Lebanon.

The views expressed in this information brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund.
________________________________________
[1] See Ali Abunimah, "President Obama and the Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Peace: An Analysis," Palestine Center Information Brief No. 169, 17 November 2008, [http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/3172/pid/223/TPL/InformationBrief/displaytype/raw].
[2] Amnesty International, "Israel used white phosphorus in Gaza civilian areas," 19 January 2009, [http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/israeli-armys-use-white-phosphorus-gaza-clear-undeniable-20090119].
[3] See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Field update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator 22-23 January 2009," [http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_humanitarian_situation_report_2009_01_22_english.pdf].
[4] For a good analysis of events leading up to the attack, see John Mearsheimer, "Another war, another defeat," The American Conservative, 26 January 2009, [http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/jan/26/00006].
[5] See http://www.bdsmovement.net.
[6] Amos Harel, "IDF censor bans naming officers involved in Gaza op," Haaretz, 23 January 2009, [http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057964.html].
[7] See Mouin Rabbani, "Out of the rubble," The National, 23 January 2009, [http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090123/REVIEW/759141570/0/NEWS]; "Can Abbas survive after Gaza war?" Aljazeera.net, 17 January 2009, [http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/01/200911711953774195.html]; and Patrick Cockburn, "Fatah fears Gaza conflict has put Hamas in the ascendancy," The Independent, 23 January 2009, [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/fatah-fears-gaza-conflict-has-put-hamas-in-the-ascendancy-1513430.html]; Robert Fisk, "So far, Obama's missed the point on Gaza," The Independent, 22 January 2009, [http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-so-far-obamas-missed-the-point-on-gaza-1488632.html].
[8] See: "EGYPT: Biting criticism of Doha summit," Los Angeles Times blog, 19 January 2009, [http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/01/egypt-biting-cr.html].
[9] Transcript: "President Obama Delivers Remarks to State Department Employees," The Washington Post, 22 January 2009, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/22/AR2009012202550.html].
[10] See transcript of State Department Daily Press Briefing for 23 January 2009, [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jan/115333.htm].
[11] James Besser, "Mitchell As Envoy Could Split Center," The Jewish Week, 25 January 2009, [http://www.thejewishweek.com/viewArticle/c37_a14675/News/National.html].
________________________________________

The Palestine Center is an independent think-tank committed to communicating reliable and objective information about the Palestinian political experience to American policy makers, journalists, students and the general public. Established in 1991, it is the educational program of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development.

The Palestine Center brings together people and resources within the American and Palestinian communities to educate about Palestine and the Palestinian peoples ongoing quest for sovereignty on their land, civil and political rights and an end to Israeli occupation. The need for an organization such as The Palestine Center can be found in the effects of the economic, cultural and political oppression Palestinians have endured and which continues on a daily basis in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the surrounding refugee camps and for Palestinians world-wide as they struggle to retain their homeland.

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Full text: UN Resolution 1860 on Israeli Invasion of Gaza

Security Council calls for immediate "durable and fully respected" ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, humanitarian supplies and aid to Gaza, and Palestinian factional reconciliation. It also condemned all violence against civilians.

The nine clauses of Resolution 1860:

1. The Security Council stresses the urgency of and calls for an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire, leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.

2. The Security Council calls for the unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza of humanitarian assistance, including of food, fuel and medical treatment.

3. The Security Council welcomes the initiatives aimed at creating and opening humanitarian corridors and other mechanisms for the sustained delivery of humanitarian aid.

4. The Security Council calls on member states to support international efforts to alleviate the humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza, including through urgently needed additional contributions to UNWRA and through the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee.

5. The Security Council condemns all violence and hostilities directed against civilians and all acts of terrorist.

6. The Security Council calls upon member states to intensify efforts to provide arrangements and guarantees in Gaza in order to sustain a durable ceasefire and calm, including to prevent illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition and to ensure the sustained reopening of crossing points on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access between the Palestinian Authority; and in this regard, welcomes the Egyptian initiative, and other regional and international efforts that are underway.

7. The Security Council encourages tangible steps towards intra-Palestinian reconciliation including in support of mediation efforts of Egypt and the League of Arab States as expressed in the 26 November 2008 resolution, and consistent with Security Council Resolution 1850 (2008) and other relevant resolutions.

8. The Security Council calls for renewed and urgent efforts by the parties and the international community to achieve a comprehensive peace based on the vision of a region where two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace with secure and recognized borders, as envisaged in Security Council Resolution 1850 (2008), and recalls also the important of the Arab Peace Initiative.

9. The Security Council welcomes the Quartet's consideration, in consultation with the parties, of an international meeting in Moscow in 2009.

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VIDEOS & TRANSCRIPTS: 2008 Palestine Center Conference

This year's annual Palestine Center conference, "The US and the Arab World: An Assessment of American Policy in the Middle East," was illuminating and provided attendees a comprehensive overview of US policy in the region. It was held at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC on 10 October, 2008.

Watch the conference videos.

Some transcripts are online as well. Former New York Times journalist Chris Hedges, discussed American foreign policy, Islamophobia and religious fundamentalism. Washington Post journalist, Anthony Shadid and former Congressmen Paul Findley wrapped up the conference with a discussion of the Bush legacy and where US foreign policy in the Middle East should go next.

More transcripts will follow soon.

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