What Opening Rafah Means & Doesn't Mean

The news was welcomed by many around the world this week when reports about a decision taken by Egypt's current military government to open the Rafah crossing with Gaza surfaced. But what does the opening of Rafah mean? There will undoubtedly be those trying to proclaim that life is on the up and up in Gaza now and that the siege is over. But Gaza and the siege that entraps it is immensely complicated. Ignoring the nuances of this policy and thinking that Gaza is equivalent to a solid black box that just had its lid opened is entirely misleading. It is important, especially as the anniversary of the attack on the Mavi Marmara approaches, to understand what the opening of Rafah means and does not mean, and to redouble our efforts to raise awareness about, and challenge, the continued Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip.

What the Opening of Rafah Does Not Mean: The siege is over.

The siege of the Gaza Strip is a multi-layered closure with many dimensions. Several closure policies contribute to the siege effect, and the opening of Rafah is unlikely to have a major impact on the overall effect simply because the remaining closure policies, enforced by Israel, are not changing.

First, what exactly is the Rafah Crossing? Rafah is a Palestinian town in the Gaza Strip which straddles the border with Egypt. A terminal at the border exists to facilitate the travel of people across the border, but Rafah is not designed as a crossing for supplies. The opening of Rafah, while it may allow for people in Gaza to exit (with the permission of Egypt still required of course), has little effect on the actual quantity of goods coming in and out of Gaza.

The other layers of Siege

The Other Crossings: For logistical, historical and infrastructural reasons, other crossing points into Gaza are ideal for the entry of commercial or humanitarian goods. Using data from the UN Office for the Coordinate of Humanitarian Affairs, which keeps track of what is allowed into Gaza, when and through which entry, we can see a stark contrast between the different crossings. Aggregate data from June 19, 2007 through May 19, 2011 presented in this pie chart exposes just how few goods come through the Rafah crossing.

But this chart also doesn't tell the whole story. Today, most of these crossing have been closed, and in fact, thus far in 2011 95% of trucks that were permitted entry to Gaza came through the Kerem Shalom crossing. Israel has, over time, practically shutdown all other crossings.

Israel's multi-decade occupation of Gaza, and Gaza's history as an integral part of historic Palestine for millenia, created infrastructure and logistical realities which make supplying it from the north far more easy than the south. The population density of Israel/Palestine over time has always been greater than that of Egypt's Sinai, meaning resources would be centrally located in the middle of historic Palestine and distributed naturally to its perimeter.

By retaining total control over the other crossings, Israel is still able to maintain its siege policy to practically the same exact extent as before the opening of Rafah. Unless Egypt and Palestine completely revamp the Rafah crossing and the infrastructure around it on both sides of the border, this is unlikely to change. Also, such changes are highly unlikely for both political and economic considerations. It is simply not a cost effective investment to bring supplies to Gaza in a roundabout fashion when the land it has always been economically integrated into is to its north. Further, separating Gaza from historic Palestine, in anyway, is a political minefield because of its potential implications to the struggle for Palestinian self-determination.

Electricity and Water: For many of the same reasons explained above, Gaza is overwhelmingly dependent on Israel when it comes to electricity. This 2010 special focus report from UN OCHA states "the Gaza Strip’s needs range between 240 and 280 megawats (MW), of which at least 42 percent is purchased from Israel, distributed in separate feeder lines along the Gaza Strip, and six to seven percent is purchased from Egypt, distributed mainly to the Rafah area"

It explains the genesis of the electricity problem well:

The shortage of electricity in the Gaza Strip dates back to June 2006, when the Israeli Air Force destroyed all six transformers at the GPP during an air strike. Five months later, the power plant resumed production, but at a significantly reduced level; producing around 65 MW (out of 80MW of potential capacity), compared to 118MW at peak production (out of 140 MW of potential capacity) prior to the bombardment.

Israel’s imposition of a blockade on the Gaza Strip in June 2007, following the Hamas take-over, further tightened existing restrictions on imports of spare parts, equipment, consumables and industrial fuel required for the operation of the power plant and the electricity network.. As a result, there has been a chronic shortfall in the GPP’s level of electricity production. Since January 2010, the daily electricity deficit has increased further, following the expiration of the European Commission’s direct subsidy to the fuel purchase for the GPP. Since this time, the power plant has twice had to shut down completely, due to lack of fuel. The plant now operates using one turbine, producing only 30 MW of electricity, compared to its average production of 60-65 MW in 2009.

Israel's control over the vast majority of electricity generated outside of Gaza, and their ability to deny the sustainable development of electricity generation inside Gaza by preventing the materials necessary for bringing the power-plant up to capacity, gives them effective light-switch control over Gaza.

Electricity has a direct impact on the issue of clean water as well. Amnesty International reports that 90-95 percent of the drinking water in Gaza is contaminated and unfit for consumption. The United Nations even found that bottled water in Gaza contained contaminants, likely due to the plastic bottles recycled in dysfunctional factories. The lack of sufficient power for desalination and sewage facilities results in significant amounts of sewage seeping into Gaza's coastal aquifer--the main source of water for the people of Gaza.

The Blockade: People often use the words blockade and siege interchangeably and this is simply inaccurate. The blockade of Gaza is enforced by the Israeli navy off the coast of Gaza and in Gaza's territorial waters. The siege is a combination of restrictive and punitive policies which includes the blockade, but also some of the other issues discussed above. The blockade itself, however, has a specific but equally devastating impact on Gaza, its people and its economy. For Gaza's fishing industry in particular this has been destructive. Israel enforces it's illegal naval blockade at the 3-nautical mile mark (most of the fish native to Gaza's territorial water's are beyond this mark) and when Gaza's fisherman get too close, they get shot. In fact, three fisherman were injured just this morning when Israeli naval boats fired on them.

While Israel argues its blockade is to keep weapons out of Gaza, it has yet to provide an explanation as to why it is shooting Palestinian fisherman coming from Gaza on dinghies. The effects of this have been so severe, that a coastal territory with a rich seafaring history farms fish on land and imports fresh fish now from Israel. Needless to say, the opening of the Rafah crossing will have little impact on this aspect of the siege.

What the Opening of Rafah Does Mean: The Closing of A Dark Chapter in Egypt's History

The siege of the Gaza Strip is a disgraceful policy that collectively punishes civilians in direct opposition to international humanitarian law and is an ugly scar on the conscience of the international community. Egypt, sadly, played an undeniable roll in this policy under the Mubarak regime despite the fact that most Egyptians vehemently disagreed with this policy. While the Egyptian closure of Rafah was a minor contributor to the overall effects of the siege compared to Israeli restrictions, Mubarak regime complicity was viewed as treacherous in the eyes of most in the Arab and Muslim world. Most Palestinians and frankly most people around the world knew that the people of Egypt did not agree with what the government of Egypt was doing. Any who doubted this were thoroughly convinced after January 25th, 2011.

However, the extent to which this truly is the end of a dark chapter in Egyptian history will be determined by what kind of role the new Egypt will play toward Gaza, and whether the opening of Rafah is the first or last step it takes toward breaking the Israeli-led policy of siege. Making sure Palestinians in Gaza can travel freely in and out of the newly opened Rafah crossing, without discriminatory visa and security-check delays which have debilitated travel in the past, would be an immensely important next step in the right direction.

read more...

Top 10 Wikileaks Palestine Nuggets

UPDATE: Make sure to read latest post on the Wikileaks and the Arab World here.

Wikileaks, the website set up to be a clearinghouse for classified information leaked through secure online channels, has once again published thousands of leaked documents, this time pertaining to American diplomacy around the world. The leaked reports are in the form of "cables" which are diplomatic communications or reports shared between embassies and U.S. diplomatic officials. The origins of the cables vary from different U.S. embassies around the globe to the Department of State in Washington, D.C. While the communications cover relations with many different countries, a significant portion deals with nations in the Middle East.

This post will focus on the most recent leaks as they relate to Palestine, and below are 10 of the more interesting passages relating to Palestine, the Palestinians and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Note that quotes in the text below are from the documents themselves, which may be paraphrased summaries of conversations and are not necessarily verbatim. There is very little here that should come as a surprise to those closely following the international relations of the Middle East and the politics around Palestine. These documents do, however, provide interesting context and color to these relations that were previously unavailable. Since this seems to be the first part of a large document dump by Wikileaks, I will update this post or create another one as the information becomes available.

#1. Qatar's Prime Minister met with Senator John Kerry and discussed a variety of issues including Qatar's views on the Palestinian issue. At the time, the Prime Minister suggested proximity talks which were ongoing between the Israelis and Palestinians would waste time - in his estimate 4-6 months. He also emphasized that negotiations without Hamas are unlikely to be fruitful since the "Palestinian Authority (PA) cannot sign off on an agreement on behalf of the Palestinians where open divisions exist." To no one's surprise, Qatar's PM was not keen on the role Egypt has been playing in the region. Egypt, which has "no end game" in mind when it comes to brokering Hamas-Fatah reconciliation talks, is like a doctor relying on only one patient for business: "the physician is going to keep the patient alive but in the hospital for as long as possible."

#2. Egypt's head of General Intelligence Omar Suleiman would provide little evidence to suggest the Qatari leader's criticism of their biased brokering was untrue. In a conversation with U.S. General Patreaus he stated that "Egypt's three primary objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. " Suleiman also stated that Egypt would continue to be committed to Palestinian reconciliation. "It is hard," he said, "but I am always optimistic. I consider myself a patient man, but I am loosing [sic] patience."

#3. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu met with U.S. Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) just before becoming prime minister again and forming the current Israeli coalition government. When describing "his approach to 'economic peace' with the Palestinians, Netanyahu suggested he would cut through bureaucratic obstacles to Palestinian economic development to build a 'pyramid' from the 'bottom up' that would strengthen the Palestinian Authority, and offer the Palestinians a viable alternative to radicalism." He also indicated he wasn't interested in a sovereign Palestinian state emerging in the West Bank, but rather "an agreement over territory,settlements and 'refined' Palestinian sovereignty without an army or control over air space and borders." Further evidence of Netanyahu's stance, which he states is not unlike Livni's, is described in a cable about a meeting between Netanyahu and a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) in late April 2009. He states "A Palestinian state must be demilitarized, without control over its air space and electro-magnetic field, and without the power to enter into treaties or control its borders. Netanyahu concluded that he and opposition leader Tzipi Livni 'only disagree about the name,' i.e. the two-state solution."

#4. An Israeli assessment of Palestinian leadership: "Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the subject of the Palestinian political situation. It was widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour assessment of Abbas's future. In one exchange, Amos Gilad stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically past the year 2011. Gilad further stated that Abbas is facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas considerably. The Israelis said the perception in the Arab world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk away from him. ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that could be taken to bolster Abbas. Gilad responded by stating that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues -- specifically on the security sector front. Gilad expressed optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing improvements in the security and economic spheres, and further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF) footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for advancing the relationship."

#5. This cable, from a 2007 meeting between U.S. Congressmen and Netanyahu, sheds light on Netanayhu's strategy vis-a-vis Hamas and Fatah: "Netanyahu said Abbas was a 'nice man who means well,' but he added that Israel and the U.S. should focus on 'bringing down Hamas' through an 'economic squeeze'...Netanyahu predicted that Palestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he can deliver the money. He suggested putting in place an 'economic squeeze with an address,' so that Hamas would receive the popular blame."

#6. Israel-PA consultations before Israeli assault on Gaza? According to Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak in this cable: "the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers from both."

#7. Europeans, particularly the French, are not pleased with their role in peace process: "A sense of frustration and ambition informs the French approach toward the Middle East peace process: they are frustrated that they must rely on the USG and on stubborn parties in the region to end a conflict whose persistence adversely affects their national interests, and they are ambitious to play a larger role in the peace process, in order to facilitate a successful outcome and to enjoy the prestige that such a role would earn them. As a case in point, last week Kouchner had to cancel a planned visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories in part because of the continuing tension there, and in part because of Israel's refusal to allow him to visit a French hospital in Gaza."

#8. Germans suggested using Goldstone Reports at UNSC as leverage over Israel's policy of home demolition: "Heusgen said that Germany 'perceives this differently' and thought Netanyahu needed 'to do more' in order bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table. With Palestinians in East Jerusalem getting notices from Israeli authorities that their houses will be destroyed, it would be 'suicide' for President Abbas to move under the current circumstances. Heusgen said he could not fathom why Netanyahu did not understand this. He suggested pressuring Netanyahu by linking favorable UNSC treatment of the Goldstone Report to Israel committing to a complete stop in settlement activity. Gordon said that making a direct linkage between the two would almost certainly be counterproductive, but agreed that it was worth pointing out to the Israelis that their policy on settlements was making it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC. Heusgen said this certainly would be an issue when Netanyahu and 'half of his cabinet' visit Berlin on November 30 for bilateral government consultations."

#9. UAE reaction to Hamas 06 election victory: The UAE 'felt the Muslim Brotherhood rally behind Hamas' after its electoral victory in the Palestinian territories, and that the Hamas victory should be a lesson to the West. UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, 'with some pressure,' would understand the need to respect the will of the international community."

#10. Israel loves cooperation with PA: Amos Gilad "noted that Israeli-PA security and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described Palestinian security forces as the 'good guys.'"

UPDATE:

Bonus #11. French President Sarkozy "called Prime Minister Netanyahu directly on October 26, to urge him to establish an independent investigation into the actions of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza conflict. Sarkozy told Netanyahu that such a step would decrease pressure on Israel and its allies stemming from the Goldstone Report, but Netanyahu responded briskly: "No way." This preceded an Israeli-French strategic dialogue which included significant discussion about the peace process. The French and the Israelis did not see eye to eye and this made an Israeli official to describe "Franco-Israeli discussions on the status of the peace process itself resembled a 'conversation of the deaf'."

UPDATE II:

Bonus #12 Ireland took issue with the US sending weapons to Israel in the past. This cable states that the Irish "Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)" made a "oral but definitive decision during the Lebanon conflict to forbid U.S. military transits carrying munitions to Israel" the cable goes on to cite the "Irish public's overwhelming opposition to Israeli military actions in Lebanon". I wonder what they think after Gaza.

read more...

Palestinian Factions Disagree to Agree

The latest disagreement between the leading Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fateh, is over whether the current parliament could continue even though its four-year mandate has expired.

The party's traded accusations, charging each other with undermining Palestinian democracy -- a phrase uttered less frequently these days as compared to four years ago. Their positions are rooted in competing legal claims. Hamas cited the Palestinian Basic Law, which they contend ends a parliament's mandate only when its new members are sworn-in. They asserted the current parliament, which has not convened fully since 2007, should stay in place until new elections are held.

Fateh argued that the Hamas-dominated chamber's four-year term had legally ended. Only President Mahmoud Abbas, Fateh's leader, can call for a parliamentary session, they argued.

To enforce its position, the Palestinian Authority's police forces arrested six Hamas-aligned staff members of the Palestinian Legislative Council's speaker Aziz Dweik, according to another PLC member. The alleged arrests followed a conference given by Dweik, who called on Mahmoud Abbas to support a meeting with all PLC members of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

It is clear the factions are as divided as they have been since Hamas won a landslide victory in parliamentary elections on January 25, 2006. They took 74 of the 132 seats, up-ending Fateh's historic dominance in Palestinian politics. A series of events and American and Israeli pressure, led to the current political rupture in which Hamas forcefully took control of Gaza and Fateh took over the West Bank.

Egyptian mediation has failed to reconcile the parties. They have been unable to agree on a date for new elections, with the latest date of June 28 on the table, giving way to this current disagreement.

read more...

Mixed Arab Messages on Normalization?

United States government officials claimed they extracted "pledges" from a number of Arab states to move toward normalization of relations with Israel in exchange for a settlement freeze. Today it was reported that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu visited in secret an unnamed Arab country with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations.

The Jerusalem newspaper Al Manar reported that Netanyahu secretly visited an Arab country with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations on Monday.

According to the report, Netanyahu met with two senior personages from Arab countries, accompanied by two of his advisers, and discussed cooperation vis-a-vis Iran. According to IDF Radio, Israeli observers speculated Monday that Netanyahu had gone to Qatar, Oman or Bahrain.

According to the U.S. officials, some Arab states have agreed to let Israel open offices in their territory, others have agreed to grant visas to Israeli businessmen and tourists, and still others have offered to allow direct telephone connections between Israel and their countries. A few Arab countries have agreed to hold high-level public meetings with senior Israeli officials, and others have agreed to let Israeli planes fly through their air space or even land at their airports.

So far the Arab position has been to condition normalization developments on a settlement freeze. Last week, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit said that normalized relations between Israel and the Arab world is possible, but only on the condition that peace talks be renewed with the Palestinians and that settlement-building be halted. He was speaking in a joint press conference with his Spanish counterpart, Miguel Angel Moratinos in Cairo.

Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa told a press conference that given Israel's "stubbornness" over the settlements, there is no place for any moves toward normalization.

"Israel is still refusing to freeze construction in the settlements," he said. "As long as that continues, it is impossible to talk about steps toward normalization."

Hamas warned against "free normalization." Khaled Mashal, head of the Political Bureau of the Hamas movement, said that “this formula is asking for Arab normalization with Israel in return for a 9-month settlement freeze, the does not even include Jerusalem.”

read more...

Clashing Visions and Competing Interests: American, Israeli and Arab Approaches to Peace by Amjad Atallah, Daniel Levy and Michael C. Hudson (16 July 2009)

Click to Play

A panel discussion featuring:

Mr. Amjad Atallah, Co-Director
Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation

Audio

Download (right click, then 'save as')

Mr. Daniel Levy, Co-Director and Senior Fellow
Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation


Dr. Michael C. Hudson, Director and Professor
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University
Audio:

Download (right click, then 'save as')


16 July 2009
The Palestine Center

This panel addressed similarities and differences in the approaches of the United States, Israel and the Arabs towards an end of conflict, whether coordination is possible, and what distinct roles each nation or group of nations should have in the peace process.

Amjad Atallah
Co-Director, Middle Task East Force, New America Foundation
Mr. Atallah is the co-director of the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation.

Prior to working at the New America Foundation, he headed the Strategic Assessments Initiative, an organization committed to providing legal and policy assistance to parties in conflict and post-conflict situations. He also advised the Palestinian negotiating team in peace negotiations with Israel on the issues of international borders, security and constitutional issues.

Daniel Levy
Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Middle East Task Force, New America Foundation

In addition to his work at the New America Foundation, Mr. Levy is a senior fellow and director of the Prospects for Peace Initiative at The Century Foundation. He was a member of the Israeli delegation to the Taba negotiations with the Palestinians in January 2001 and previously served on the Israeli negotiating team to the "Oslo B" Agreement from May to September 1995, under the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Michael C. Hudson
Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and Professor of International
Relations, Georgetown University

Michael C. Hudson is the Seif Ghobash Professor of Arab Studies in the Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University. He is regularly interviewed about Middle East issues in the news media, including the BBC, Arabic satellite channels and major newspapers. Among Dr. Hudson's publications are Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy and The Palestinians: New Directions.

read more...

Wilson Center Convenes Panel on the Two-State Solution

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars hosted a panel discussion on "Obama and the Two-State Solution: Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian Perspectives." The panelists’ expression of opposing views demonstrated the contentions of achieving what is so often described as the international consensus of a two-state settlement.

Panel moderator Aaron David Miller presented his skeptical interpretation of the possibilities for a peace solution. Martin Kramer attempted to shift the discussion away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict toward the Iranian nuclear threat. Ziad Asali and Samer Shehata felt Obama has placed the right amount of urgency on jumpstarting the peace process while remaining cognizant of the significant challenges facing a potential solution to the conflict.

Aaron David Miller, a Wilson Center Public Policy Fellow and long-time American peace broker, framed the conversation in terms of Obama’s Cairo speech, which he described as raising expectations and creating a sense of urgency. He contrasts this sense of urgency to the difficult prospects for a solution with the difficult issues of Jerusalem, refugees, and border security. Miller believed that Obama may be the last American president who can pursue a two-state solution.

Speaking from the Palestinian perspective, the first panelist, Ziad Asali of the American Task Force on Palestine, opened the debate with the status quo in the region, believing that the conflict is not at a plateau but in a downward spiral. As a result, painful compromises are necessary to attain a two-state solution. He praised the Obama approach, which sees a solution to the conflict as essential to the creation of a coalition to oppose Iran. Asali stressed the importance of the international community in fostering a united Palestinian leadership to allow Israel a negotiating partner while highlighting the contradictory messages on the inclusion of Hamas. Then, Asali called Obama’s approach the correct one, with its emphasis on a non-military solution to the conflict and in addressing Arab concerns. He described settlements as the single most important political issue Obama needs to deliver to the Arab world.

From the Israeli view, Martin Kramer, a fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was highly critical of the Obama approach to Middle East peace. He judged it as a fixation of the administration on second-order issues, which he likened to the Bush administration’s obsession with Iraq during the war on terror. He believes that without dealing with the Iranian issue first, a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is impossible. Kramer put forward the notion that the divisions among the Palestinian people raised the question as to whether they truly constitute a “nation,” a view criticized by the two other panelists. He felt that the idea of a Palestinian state is different among Israelis, Palestinians, and the international community. Believing the Israeli state solved the Jewish question, Kramer concluded that any Palestinian state must solve the Palestinian question of identity, which he remarked was fundamentally fragmented. Kramer ended by calling for Obama to stop focusing on a two-state solution, as it is not an urgent issue.

The final panelist, Samer Shehata, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, spoke from the perspective of the Egyptian public, not the Mubarak government or the opposition. Shehata began by stating that a two-state solution is essential and is not a second-order issue to the containment of Iran. He refuted Kramer by citing the diversity of Israel and other nations that exist as states as examples of how there is a Palestinian identity. He called Egypt important for the peace process because of its ties with Israel, influence in the region, and its central geopolitical role. Egypt’s favor with the United States declined under President Bush because of a shifting emphasis from the conflict to promoting democracy, but it will play an important position under Obama. He called Egypt a partial mediator, as it is a direct party to the conflict. Most Egyptians feel so strongly about Palestine that it has become a domestic policy issue. However, the Mubarak regime, which has its own security concerns about terrorism, border security, refugees, and Islamist movements, favors Fateh over Hamas, creating a bias which challenges its role as an impartial mediator.

Miller ended the discussion, stating that every time America as a superpower fails in either war or peace, it comes with a price to American credibility and power. Challenges such as a divided Israeli government and a dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, which does not have a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, make Obama’s success improbable. Finally, Miller noted that success for this administration must be defined as either a final status agreement or an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty.

While each panelist presented his own perspective on the utility of Obama’s vision for peace, all speakers failed to address what concrete steps should be taken by the Obama administration in creating a solution to the conflict. Furthermore, the conflicting opinions of the panelists highlighted the challenges of bringing together the divergent interests of each actor to the negotiating table. Miller’s perspective emphasized the American preoccupation with maintaining its strategic position as a world superpower, with his primary concern being that Obama’s actions could harm that position. Kramer’s focus on Iran and his rejection of the notion of a singular Palestinian identity exemplifies an Israeli position which seems more comfortable with the status quo than affecting a lasting solution. The measured optimism of Shehata and Asali indicates that although many Arabs see more hope with an administration which addresses their concerns, neither panelist was able to offer any concrete solutions to the very real problems of Palestinian disunity. This panel presentation offered a fascinating glimpse into the perspectives and interests of major players to the conflict, but ultimately, highlighted the need for compromise on fundamental issues.


*This summary was authored by the Palestine Center summer interns, Hania Bekdash, Holly Larsen, Daniel Magalotti, and Zachary Sideris.

Views expressed on this post or on linked web pages do not represent the Palestine Center, the educational program of the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development. All content is for educational purposes only.

read more...

Helena Cobban: Shifting Dimensions of the Palestinian Question

Shifting Dimensions of the Palestinian Question: Conclusions from a Reporting Trip

Download Audio



Transcripts

Helena Cobban
Writer and Researcher
Tuesday, 31 March 2009

Back from a month-long reporting trip to the Middle East that took her to Egypt, Jordan, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel, Helena Cobban shares her findings and conclusions based on first-hand accounts of developments on the ground. During the trip, Cobban interviewed more than 45 people ranging from Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to several Hamas lawmakers and senior officials with aid agencies working in the Gaza Strip.

Helena Cobban is a writer and researcher who has worked on Palestinian issues since 1974. She worked for The Christian Science Monitor for many years, first as a reporter and later as a columnist. Over the past decade, Ms. Cobban has written extensively in The Boston Review on her long-maintained blog, 'Just World News', and elsewhere on developments in Israel and Palestine.

read more...

Prisoner Exchange for Schalit Expected Soon

Israeli Noam Schalit walks in front
of a picture of his captured son
The deadline for a deal releasing 1000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Israeli Corporal Gilad Schalit passed uneventfully on Sunday. However, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert extended the deadline 24 hours. Israeli negotiators returned to Jerusalem late Monday night and headed immediately for a closed door meeting with PM Olmert. Rumors have stated that a deal has been reached, and these reports have been strengthened by the presence of Hamas military leader Ahmed Al-Jaabari in Cairo. Al-Jaabari has been responsible for Cpl. Schalit since his capture over two years ago and is rarely seen in public.

The specifics of the deal remain unclear, but the Associated Press reported over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners would be released by Israel in return for Schalit. The details of which prisoners are to be released have not been leaked, though several high-profile prisoners are expected. The battle has raged over which prisoners would be released and where they would be released. Israel has fought to release the prisoners outside Palestinian territory, in Syria, while Hamas has argued they must be freed in Gaza and the West Bank. Additionally, the potential deal has evoked a fiery debate in Israel as to how many prisoners are just for the return of one, Cpl. Gilad Schalit.

A successful prisoner exchange would serve as a huge victory in the waning days of Olmert’s premiership and would set the stage for further talks of a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. There is much speculation in the media that Israel will loosen its siege upon Gaza in response to a return of Schalit, however on the Palestinian side there is suspicion as to whether this will be the case. The prisoner exchange would also function as a victory for Hamas, bettering their support among the Palestinian people, but it remains to be seen if they will achieve all their demands for prisoners.

read more...

VIDEOS & TRANSCRIPTS: 2008 Palestine Center Conference

This year's annual Palestine Center conference, "The US and the Arab World: An Assessment of American Policy in the Middle East," was illuminating and provided attendees a comprehensive overview of US policy in the region. It was held at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC on 10 October, 2008.

Watch the conference videos.

Some transcripts are online as well. Former New York Times journalist Chris Hedges, discussed American foreign policy, Islamophobia and religious fundamentalism. Washington Post journalist, Anthony Shadid and former Congressmen Paul Findley wrapped up the conference with a discussion of the Bush legacy and where US foreign policy in the Middle East should go next.

More transcripts will follow soon.

read more...