Did #Israel Provoke #Gaza Escalation to Test 'Iron Dome'?

When the Israeli military extra-judicially assassinated the Popular Resistance Committee leader Zuhair Qaisi they provoked a barrage of rockets. I knew this would happen. They also knew very well that this would happen. Anyone looking at the numbers and the dynamics of violence in and out of Gaza would know this would happen. The Israelis claim that Qaisi was planning an attack through Sinai. Of course, they provide no evidence of this. We are just supposed to take them at their word. Reports also indicate that the Israelis were monitoring Qaisi's every move for some time.

Qaisi's predecessor was killed by an Israeli assassination last August in an Israeli strike which left 6 dead, including a 3 year old child. The Israelis claimed an attack that came from Sinai on Eilat had originated in Gaza. This seemed suspicious at the time. The Eilat attack was well coordinated and beyond what anyone estimated to be the operational capabilities of a small faction like the PRC. Sure enough, we later learned the IDF acknowledged that Egyptian Beduin perpetrated the attack. It was easier and less politically costly for the Israelis to retaliate against Gaza since nobody seems to ask questions when Israelis kill Palestinians in Gaza - its become routine. Had they struck at Egypt however, they would have to calculate the unknown variable of a revolutionary Egypt's reaction. Gaza was the more convenient place to go for revenge. Israeli journalist Amira Hass noted at the time how no signs in Gaza pointed to local responsibility for the attacks.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that Qaisi was planning an attack, the timing of the Israeli assassination was still elected and not forced since, as the Israelis admit, Qaisi was not an imminent threat.

This begs the question; Why would the Israeli government take an action which they know would immediately provoke a response putting more Israelis at risk than if they would not have. The Israelis claim to have had detailed intelligence to justify the assassination of Qaisi so wouldn't it make more sense to use that information to defend Israeli interests without provoking a response that would bring a barrage of projectile file? Of course it would, but that is not the course of action the Israelis chose.

It seems as though they wanted to provoke a response. But why? Why would the Israeli government put Israelis at risk when this was entirely avoidably? (Of course, they ultimately put Palestinians at risk the most but the Israeli government has never been all too concerned about that anyway)

It may be because something happened on the way to AIPAC. While Netanyahu and his Israel Lobby friends have done a very good job of convincing members of Congress to support an Israeli strike on Iran, there is one audience that is significantly less convinced and less gung-ho; Israelis.

From a poll that was released immediately before the AIPAC conference (obviously intentional timing) we learned that the Israeli public and their Prime Minister are not on the same page. Shibley Telhami writes about the poll conducted with the Israeli Dahaf Institute at the end of February 2012:

Only 19 percent of Israelis polled expressed support for an attack without U.S. backing, according to a poll I conducted — fielded by Israel’s Dahaf Institute Feb. 22-26 — while 42 percent endorsed a strike only if there is at least U.S. support, and 32 percent opposed an attack regardless.

This does not appear to be because of Israeli worries about potential American punishment. In fact, Israelis remain confident the U.S. would support them, at least diplomatically (38 percent), or join the war on Israel’s behalf (27 percent) — even if Israel struck Iran without Washington’s approval. Only 15 percent expect reduced American support. What seems behind these attitudes is an assessment of the consequences of an Israeli attack.

A majority of Israelis polled, roughly 51 percent, said the war would last months (29 percent) or years (22 percent), while only 18 percent said it would last days. About as many Israelis, 44 percent, think that an Israeli strike would actually strengthen Iran’s government as think it would weaken it (45 percent).

Two-thirds of Israelis, meanwhile, believe Hezbollah would most likely join Iran in retaliation against Israel — even if Israel did not strike Hezbollah forces. An additional 27 percent believe Hezbollah would join only if attacked.

So here is Netanyahu, putting all his effort and focus toward saber rattling, and his public isn't going along. Netanyahu would not likely carry out an attack that his public is against and Iran and the US know that electoral constraints would mean even the most belligerent rhetoric isn't likely to be backed up with action if it will cost a leader his office. The greatest obstacle to Israeli public support for a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran is the belief that the consequences of the attack from Iran, Hezbollah and other factions like Islamic Jihad, would be too high a cost to bear.

What could the Israeli government do to change this perception? Well, a successful large scale live action test of the US funded Iron Dome would probably help, and assassinating a PRC militant would provoke the projectiles to trigger one.

As the 'Iron Dome' (which can also refer to Israel's hard-headed policy toward Gaza) was put into use, Israeli right wing publications openly favoring belligerency toward Iran happily reported on the success of the system. Israeli publications that have been less hawkish on Iran took a different approach.

Haaretz's Aluf Benn picks up on on how Netanyahu is "preparing Israeli public opinion for war on Iran" yet somehow fails to even mention Gaza in his piece, let alone ask the obvious question about whether shaping Israeli public opinion toward war could explain the inexplicable Israeli decision making behind provoking projectile fire from Gaza.

27 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza and 80 more injured from Israeli fire after the assassination of Qaisi.

Are these mere sacrificial guinea pigs for Netanyahu's experiment?

Mourners in Gaza are not waiting for Haaretz to ask that question.

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Wikileaked: The Gulf Between Dictators and Their People

Now that a few days have gone by since the initial release of some secret U.S. State Department cables by the website WikiLeaks, we can pause and reflect on some of the reaction to the revelations brought forth by the cables and ask what this all really means. A great deal has been made out of the cables relating to the Middle East and Iran and the views of some Arab leaders toward this issue. Earlier in the week I also made a list of some of the important cables relating to Palestine.

One of the immediate, and typical reactions to come from the Middle East, was conspiracy theory. This is sadly endemic in a region that has been betrayed by colonizers and occupiers throughout its history and has witnessed several coups only to later learn they were dreamed up in foreign capitals. Nevertheless, as revelations put the focus on Iran, some have begun to suggest that WikiLeaks is an Israeli conspiracy. There is no shortage of instances where Israel has had its hand in events in the Middle East, but to suggest that the WikiLeaks revelations are one of them seems like a stretch to me. On this note, those who look at the revealed cables and question the undue focus on Iran should keep three things in mind: First, it's Western media that has sensationalized its interpretation of the cables in a way that supposedly facilitates confrontation with Iran (I'll explain why I say supposedly below). Second, the fact there there is no love lost between some Arab rulers and Iran is nothing new and not much of a revelation at all; it's merely a confirmation of what was assumed by many and said behind closed doors. Third, a fraction of the cables have been released so far. According to the Cablegate website, nearly 8,000 cables originated from the Embassy in Ankara, 6,000 from Baghdad, 4,000 from Amman, and anywhere from 2-4,000 cables originated from Embassies and Consulates in Kuwait, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo and so on. There is probably A LOT more to be learned about wheeling and dealing in the Middle East and U.S.-Israel relations from what is yet to come.

The real story behind the fact that the cables showcased previously non-public feelings of Arab rulers toward Iran is not that they actually feel this way but rather, that they make every effort not to express these sentiments publicly. Anyone with a sense of the region's geopolitics and history would probably have been able to predict the feelings of each of these Arab rulers and the extent of their angst with Tehran. It comes as no surprise that Qatar's ruler, who had the most restrained concern about Iran, shares a natural gas field with their Persian neighbors. Likewise, it was entirely predictable that the most bellicose sentiments would come from leaders in the U.A.E, who have a territorial dispute with Iran, and Sunni-ruled Bahrain that represses its largely Shia, Iranian sympathetic, polity. The big question (and really the most obvious one) which most mainstream media outlets in the West have failed to pose is why the secrecy? Why hide your feelings about Iran? Why not just come out and say it?

The reason they won't take these stances publicly is the real story here. Just look at some of the emphasis put on keeping these sentiments secret. Here is a cable describing how Oman is irked by U.S. reporting of weapons sales to Oman, and how "any belief that the U.S. would attempt to utilize Omani territory in this way could potentially cause a public backlash that would jeopardize other aspects of our relationship. The deployment of Patriots to Oman, especially with the goal of countering the Iran threat, would run completely counter to Oman's publicly-stated foreign-policy objectives."

Another cable describes the not so unique position of another Arab official in the U.A.E: "MbZ's pre-occupation with Iran (and his secondary concern about Islamic fundamentalism) lead him to have a strategic view of the region that is curiously close to the Israeli one. But domestic politics flow the other way, and he feels constrained in what he can say publicly." He also believes that "if there were an election in Dubai tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over."

Or this cable where Egyptian President Mubarak talks about how "he opined that no Arab state will join the U.S. in a defense relationship vis-a-vis Iran out of fear of 'sabotage and Iranian terrorism.'" He said Iran's sponsorship of terrorism is "well-known but I cannot say it publicly. It would create a dangerous situation." Mubarak said that sanctions are the best hope for containing Iran, but Arab states won't dare to endorse them."

So why not? The reality is the Arab publics do not view Iran the same way their unelected leaders do. In fact, most Arabs support Iran's right to a nuclear program. Polling shows that support for Iranian nuclear ambitions in the Arab world is high and that Arabs see Israel and the U.S. as the most significant threats they face, with Iran being an insignificant concern. One should keep in mind that this polling, while likely the most representative and comprehensive we have available, is heavily skewed toward largely Sunni publics in what are described as moderate Arab states. Surely, the inclusion of countries like Iraq and Bahrain, which have large Shia populations, or countries like Syria, which have a pro-Iran slant and, to a lesser extent, Qatar, would probably show even more Arab public support for Iran's nuclear ambitions, and even greater distaste for Israel and the U.S.

But, you may be asking, if these Arab states are in fact autocracies, why does public opinion there matter? Well there are two immediate answers to this, one more obvious than the other: The first, and the more obvious one, is that angering Arab publics isn't going to win over any hearts or minds, and, as General Patreaus noted earlier this year, will complicate U.S. missions in the region. Still, suppose the Arab States, like the neo-cons who support confrontation with Iran, don't mind a exponential spike in transnational terror recruitment. Why else would opposing public opinion on this important foreign policy issue, which would lead to what one Arab official called a "catastrophic impact on the region," be a bad idea?

Because the public reaction may very well significantly raise the costs of regime survival to the Arab states. Iran has sympathetic constituencies in most Arab states in the region which led another Arab official to state that the "Shi'a crescent has become a full moon." The cost of putting down domestic uprisings is not cheap, and Iran knows this and can exploit this significantly as it continues with its nuclear program. Around the Arab world, Iranian support for sympathetic constituencies acts as a deterrent that would raise the costs of action against the Iranian regime for many Arab states.

So all this puts the neo-cons in a very peculiar position. Many of the Iran hawks, who had previously supported the invasion of Iraq, defend the policy of regime change by claiming the installation of democracy was worth it all. Now they point to unelected Arab rulers, who'd be acting against popular will, as support for attacking Iran.

This makes them very much like one of the Arab rulers, Hosni Mubarak (the third longest ruling leader in Egypt's 5,000 year history, who's party just won 95% of seats in parliament) who had this advice for the U.S. in Iraq: "Forget democracy" he said "strengthen the armed forces, relax your hold, and then you will have a coup. Then we will have a dictator, but a fair one."

Oh, well, I guess when you put it that way, it is easier to understand why conspiracy theories are so prevalent in this region.

I guess what the Iran war hawks and Arab rulers have in common is that they are both willing to look the other way when dictators trample democracy, so long as it suits their interests.

That said, the real revelation produced by these cables is the gulf between the attitudes of Arab publics and those who rule them. As mentioned above, some have interpreted these revelations to mean that there are fewer obstacles in the path to U.S. or Israeli confrontation with Iran. It seems to be quite the contrary. These revelations have effectively exposed embarrassing positions held by some Arab leaders vis-a-vis Iran, and have already led some to back-off on the rhetoric divulged in the cables. Unsurprisingly, Arab state-directed media outlets have yet to strongly question the leadership of their respective countries about the stances revealed in the cables. Meanwhile, others have been forced to back-off. Bahrain, whose King had "argued forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear program, by whatever means necessary," provided this awkward retreat here:

"The illegally-leaked and published US documents by the WikiLeaks website reflect US officials' own analysis and understanding of the conclusions of their joint meetings with the leaders and officials in the region as well as from other relevant events," Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the foreign minister, said.

"Jumping to one-sided conclusions based on such understandings will undoubtedly lead to false, incorrect and inaccurate results that would not serve security and stability in the region," he said in a statement on Tuesday evening.

According to the minister, Bahrain has also called for adherence of all countries in the region, to relevant working international laws and conventions.

"The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Bahrain on regional issues has clearly been declared and confirmed in all of our joint meetings with international officials, as well as in our public statements, official meetings or press conferences," the foreign minister said.

Bahrain has always stressed the right of all countries to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as well as the need for Middle East to be free from all weapons of mass destruction, the foreign minister said.

So if anything, the revelations in the cables will likely make any concerted effort against Iran that includes Arab states all the more difficult since the publics will undoubtedly be more skeptical about their leaders' stances on this issue, and the leaders all the more averse to being implicated in action against Iran.

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Goldberg Reax

I wrote yesterday about my thoughts on Jeffery Goldberg's piece in the Atlantic which suggested that the US better bomb Iran before Israel does. In my comments I didn't respond to all the suggestive claims in the several thousand word article and mentioned that I'd leave that to others who would likely have a field day with it. Here is a round up of some of responses that Goldberg's bomb Iran tune set off.

Amjad Atallah writes in Foreign Policy debunking the often repeated myth by pro-war types that the Arabs secretly want the US or Israel to strike Iran. Atallah notes that "hardly a day goes by without some new article touting Arab government support for a U.S. attack on Iran". He continues:

At the end of the day, the Arab public is not only not concerned about Iran's regional strength, but thinks it would be better for the region, probably in light of America's perceived weakness vis-à-vis Israel, for that regional strength to continue - unlike the assessment of their rulers. However, on the need to end Israel's occupation, there is unanimity between the rulers and the ruled.

A final note on those misconstruing the nature of Arab government concerns - at the end of the day, Arab governments want to remain in power. A strong and popular United States is the ultimate guarantor of that until there is a transition to representative forms of government. A United States that has been unable to secure Palestinian independence, that is still tied down in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that is reeling from a new war with Iran will be neither.

I would add here an interesting tidbit regarding Arab perceptions of Iran. Amjad notes the recent polling done by Shibley Telhami regarding Arab attitudes toward Iran. This is important. But what I find particularly interesting is the attitudes of Palestinian citizens of Israel toward Iran. Telhami conducted another poll in 2009 to capture these attitudes. You can read more about that poll and the views of Palestinian Citizens of Israel here and see the slide show here.

Interestingly, Palestinian Citizens of Israel have remarkably similar views regarding Iran's nuclear program as other Arabs. This is worth noting because this community is fluent Hebrew speakers, regularly consumes Israeli media output, and would fall prey in any Iranian attack on Israel. So the fact that this segment of the Israeli population is not afraid of a nuclear Iran, and a majority supports Iran's nuclear rights, suggests that the threat is perhaps over-hyped in the Israeli media.


Glen Greenwald at Salon.com exposes a pretty obvious contradiction in Goldberg's arguments for war on Iran and Iraq:

This is what a propagandist, by definition, does: asserts any claim as fact in service of a concealed agenda without the slightest concern for whether it's true. Will the existence of a vast and menacing Iraqi nuclear program help my cause (getting Americans to attack Iraq)? Fine, then I'll trumpet that. Now, however, it will help my cause (mainstreaming an attack on Iran) to claim that the Israelis permanently ended Iraq's nuclear efforts in 1981, thus showing how well these attacks can work. No problem: I'll go with that. How can anyone take seriously -- as a Middle East expert and especially as a journalist -- someone with this blatant and thorough of an estrangement from any concern for truth? Can anyone reconcile these factual claims?

Steven Clemons takes exception with Goldberg's argument at Washington Note. He argues, unlike Goldberg, that Iran is a rational actor and not a suicidal radical regime. Here is an excerpt:

What drives deterrence, and resulting stability, is that two warring parties can create unacceptably high costs for the other. And the US, in order to try and secure stability in the Middle East and offering an opening for Iran to come into the international community with American support if it changes course, feels that it needs to threaten military action.

My own view of Iran differs from that of Netanyahu who told Goldberg, "You don't want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs." While I am uncomfortable with and oppose a nuclear-armed Iran as well, Iran has shown itself to be a strategic, rational, albeit ruthless, calculator of its interests -- not an irrational, suicidal nation. It has been at odds with the U.S. for decades and displays more the attributes of a severe abuse victim whose view of the world and its options have been distorted and mal-shaped from being under regime change siege for so long. There is no likely quick fix to the absence of trust between Iran and the US and its allies.

Stephen Walt has a must read on Goldberg's piece in ForeignPolicy.com:

In short, a central purpose of this article is to mainstream the idea that an attack on Iran is likely to happen and savvy people-in-the-know should start getting accustomed to the idea. In other words, a preemptive strike on Iran should be seen not as a remote or far-fetched possibility, but rather as something that is just "business-as-usual" in the Middle East strategic environment. If you talk about going to war often enough and for long enough, people get used to the idea and some will even begin to think if it is bound to happen sooner or later, than "'twere better to be done quickly." In an inside-the-Beltway culture where being "tough" is especially prized, it is easy for those who oppose "decisive" action to get worn down and marginalized. If war with Iran comes to be seen as a "default" condition, then it will be increasingly difficult for cooler heads (including President Obama himself) to say no.

You'll recall that a similar process of "mainstreaming" occurred over Iraq: What at first seemed like the far-fetched dream of a handful of out-of-power neoconservatives in 1998 had become a serious option by 2001. By 2003, aided in no small part by the efforts of journalists such as Goldberg, the idea had been embraced by liberals and others who should have known better.

Paul Woodward hits the nail on the head at War in Context:

Worried about an Israeli attack on Iran? That’s the idea.

You must do what we can’t, because if you don’t, we will.

This is how some Israelis are trying to twist Washington’s arm to get the US to attack Iran.

A more honest way of making the argument would be to say this: If the US won’t attack Iran, then Israel will — even though it won’t accomplish its military objectives and it will open Pandora’s box. Desperate nations sometimes do desperate things. You have been warned.

Another name for this: blackmail.

Tony Karon asks an important yet simple question: "Why are the Israelis Telling Their ‘Secret’ Iran Attack Plans to Jeffrey Goldberg?" The answer:

In your dreams, Jeff: The Israelis talk to you because they want to convey a particular message in Washington; and the White House talks to you because they want you to convey a particular message to the Israelis and, more importantly, to some of their most powerful backers in America.

Here is an article with an opposite take. Michael Eisenstadt and David Christ add to the hype. Their claim is that Iran may strike first so we better beat those sneaky Iranians to the punch. They write:

...it is at least as likely that an increasingly belligerent Tehran will be the one that makes the move that sparks a conflict with the United States -- whether by an act of terrorism, by facilitating insurgent attacks in Iraq or Afghanistan, or by a military provocation in the Gulf or elsewhere -- unless Washington, acting with both caution and firmness, moves to avert such an eventuality.

Interestingly, the authors of this piece are from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the please-don't-think tank established by the premier Israel lobby, AIPAC. WINEP was in full support of the War on Iraq and since war on Iran would keep pressure off of Israel from making concessions and would guarantee Israeli regional hegemony the boys at WINEP are all for this one too.

I wonder how many proponents of war/attacks on Iran were also on the record supporting the War on Iraq. This would make for a very interesting study. If the correlation is high, and I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest it is, maybe we should ask why?

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Why Iran won't attack Israel

Palestine Center Brief No. 197 (21 April 2010) By Yousef Munayyer

This brief appeared in the Los Angeles Times and is a response to a column written by Benny Morris that was published in the Los Angeles Times on 16 April 2010.

Palestinians are in Israel today because they managed to survive the depopulation of 1948, the year the Jewish state was founded (Arabs constitute about 20% of Israel's population). Ironically, while Benny Morris' scholarship suggests that the mere existence of these Palestinians in Israel -- and millions more in the occupied territories -- irks him, Israel's substantial Arab population also blows a hole in his argument about the need to deal with the supposed Iranian nuclear threat.

Morris is part of an increasingly vociferous chorus warning of an impending apocalypse for Israel at the hands of a nuclear Iran eager to rid the Middle East of its Jews. Yet Iran's religious leaders have repeatedly stated that such weapons are "un-Islamic" or "forbidden under Islam."

Morris' role in our understanding of the region's history is confounding. Arguably, no one played a more central role in exposing Israel's role in the depopulation of Palestinians from their homeland than Morris. In his seminal work, "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem," Morris, using declassified military documents, exposes the calculated effort by early Israeli leaders to impose a Jewish majority through ethnic cleansing.

Long considered a champion of modern Israeli historians who sought to shed light on the ugly side of Israel's birth, Morris shocked many Israelis and Palestinians alike when he later changed course. To Morris, the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians was no longer the problem at the heart of the conflict; in fact, he suggested that the problem was that Israel didn't finish the job in 1948.

Morris said in a 2004 interview "Under some circumstances expulsion is not a war crime. I don't think that the expulsions of 1948 were war crimes. You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. You have to dirty your hands."

Morris added later in the interview that if Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, "was already engaged in expulsion, maybe he should have done a complete job. ... If he had carried out a full expulsion - rather than a partial one - he would have stabilized the state of Israel for generations."

Yet the pesky Palestinian minority Morris wishes had been expelled decades ago serves as a deterrent from a nuclear-armed Iran, should the Islamic Republic ever build nuclear weapons and consider using them on Israel. The fact that Arab Israelis were among the casualties of the 2006 war with Hezbollah speaks to the reality that no nuclear attack on Israel could happen without the deaths of countless Palestinians and Israelis, not to mention the likely destruction of Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam.

The reality of Palestinian casualties, the destruction of Jerusalem, the onset of regional war and the immediate destruction of Iran's regime as a result of a multilateral conventional or even nuclear counterattack all serve as a credible deterrent to a nuclear Iran. The Iranian leadership has shown a demonstrable interest in self-preservation

The alarmism espoused Morris and company isn't grounded in reality. Rather - just as with Iraq, Syria and now Iran - Israel constantly needs an enemy that it says threatens its existence. Otherwise the Jewish state would have a harder time maintaining its overwhelming military supremacy in the region and continuously changing the subject from resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to practically anything else.

The ideology at the foundation of the state of Israel and the very justification for its existence requires the existence of apocalyptic anti-Semitic forces with the intent and capability to annihilate. Without these boogeymen, whether it is Saddam Hussein, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Arabs who "want to push Israel into the sea," the state of Israel ceases to have any justification for the maintenance of a Jewish majority by force or for its ongoing occupation of Palestinian lands.

The fact that Benjamin Netanyahu, the pro-colonization Israeli prime minister, has made every effort to connect the idea of a nuclear Iran to the Holocaust is evidence of this scare-mongering. Iran, like Iraq in 2003, is an inflated but necessary fear for Israel. No credible analysis of the situation envisions a scenario in which Iran would use nuclear weapons against the Jewish state. But proponents of Israel's colonial enterprise, who support maintaining a Jewish majority by the force of walls and soldiers in occupied territory, want everyone to believe that the focus should be on Iran, not on the occupation, and that Israel's security policies are justifiable against "existential threats."

The need for these inflated threats has increased in the years since Israel signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Despite these agreements, Israel still maintains and furthers its occupation of Palestinian lands through blockade and settlement expansion.

The emperor may be naked in Tel Aviv, but he can continue avoiding attention and shame if he persuades the world to look in Tehran's direction instead.

Yousef Munayyer is Executive Director of the Palestine Center. This policy brief may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the Center.

The views in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund.

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Iran Proposal Links Palestine, UN Reform to Negotiations.

Iran sent a five-page proposal to leading world powers calling for "comprehensive, all-encompassing and constructive negotiations." It sets the outlines of Iran's approach to what some have been calling a "grand bargain" between Iran and the most global players.

The document, which was delivered to U.S., Russian, Chinese, British, French and German diplomats, linked the future of the Palestinian people and reform of the United Nations Security Council to discussion of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

The proposal envisages all-encompassing talks on political-security, international and economic issues.

While it mentions the need for addressing global problems such as environmental degradation, organized crime, drugs and illegal migration, its guiding principles seek to promote a more equitable global system in general. It reads, "Security requires reorganization and creating an opportunity for broad and collective participation in the management of the world."

It specifically mentions Palestine in a section calling for:

Joint efforts and interactions to help the people of Palestine to draw a comprehensive, democratic and equitable plan in order to help the people of Palestine to achieve all-embracing peace, lasting security and to secure their fundamental rights.

By linking the Palestinian issue, Iran may be hoping to position itself vis-a-vis political developments there. Any successes can be taken credit for, as the product of Iranian pressure, while they can distance themselves from failures since this framework will likely be rejected by the powers.

While Iranian leaders urged the non-negotiability of its nuclear power program and the proposal did not mention it directly, it said they were willing to discuss "putting into action real and fundamental programmes toward complete disarmament and preventing development and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and microbial weapons."

The State Department declined immediate comment.

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Al-Arabiya: President Obama Interview & Highlights

President Barack Obama gave his first televised interview since taking office to Al-Arabiya, an Arabic satellite television station.

Al-Arabiya posted the transcript of the interview. He pledged to fulfill his promise to give a speech from a "Muslim capital" within his first one hundred days, but offered no details. He again presented the broad outlines of his foreign policy towards the region.

Some of the highlights:

• The President told the new Middle East envoy George Mitchell to "start by listening, because all too often the United States starts by dictating -- in the past on some of these issues --and we don't always know all the factors that are involved."
  
  
• "Sending George Mitchell to the Middle East is fulfilling my campaign promise that we're not going to wait until the end of my administration to deal with Palestinian and Israeli peace, we're going to start now. It may take a long time to do, but we're going to do it now."
  
  
• He considers it "impossible for us to think only in terms of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and not think in terms of what's happening with Syria or Iran or Lebanon or Afghanistan and Pakistan."
  
  
• When asked about the sustainability of the two-state solution paradigm, the President said, "I think it is possible for us to see a Palestinian state -- I'm not going to put a time frame on it -- that is contiguous, that allows freedom of movement for its people, that allows for trade with other countries, that allows the creation of businesses and commerce so that people have a better life."
  
  
• Al-Qaeda is nervous about the Obama administration, he noted. By improving the condition of Arabs, the United States can expose their ideas as "bankrupt." He said, "There's no actions that they've (Al-Qaeda) taken that say a child in the Muslim world is getting a better education because of them, or has better health care because of them."
  
  
• On restoring Arab-US relations: "America was not born as a colonial power, and that the same respect and partnership that America had with the Muslim world as recently as 20 or 30 years ago, there's no reason why we can't restore that."
  
  
• He will avoid conflating those who criticize and oppose American policies with Al Qaeda: "you will I think see our administration be very clear in distinguishing between organizations like al Qaeda -- that espouse violence, espouse terror and act on it -- and people who may disagree with my administration and certain actions, or may have a particular viewpoint in terms of how their countries should develop."
  
  
• In terms of Iran, he opposes their nuclear ambitions, "But I do think that it is important for us to be willing to talk to Iran, to express very clearly where our differences are, but where there are potential avenues for progress. And we will over the next several months be laying out our general framework and approach."

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2008 Conference Proceedings Published

2008 Palestine Center Annual Conference
"The U.S. and the Arab World: An Assessment of American Policy in the Middle East"

At the 2008 Palestine Center Annual Conference in October, "The U.S. and the Arab World: An Assessment of American Policy in the Middle East," a wide array of experts analyzed United States foreign policy towards the Middle East during the last eight years and the challenges facing the next U.S. president. Speakers included:

Mr. Chris Hedges (transcript)
Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox
Ambassador Mokhtar Lamani
Dr. Michael C. Hudson
Dr. Hamid Dabashi
Dr. Michael Dunn
Mr. Mark Perry
Mr. Anthony Shadid
Mr. Paul Findley

(For transcripts of Shadid and Findley's speeches)

The proceedings have been published on the website.[LINK down]

The website also features video of the speakers and panels. [LINK down]

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VIDEOS & TRANSCRIPTS: 2008 Palestine Center Conference

This year's annual Palestine Center conference, "The US and the Arab World: An Assessment of American Policy in the Middle East," was illuminating and provided attendees a comprehensive overview of US policy in the region. It was held at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC on 10 October, 2008.

Watch the conference videos.

Some transcripts are online as well. Former New York Times journalist Chris Hedges, discussed American foreign policy, Islamophobia and religious fundamentalism. Washington Post journalist, Anthony Shadid and former Congressmen Paul Findley wrapped up the conference with a discussion of the Bush legacy and where US foreign policy in the Middle East should go next.

More transcripts will follow soon.

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