First, an overview of the political crisis. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas postponed the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for January and confirmed that he will not run for the office. This comes at a time where his domestic and constitutional legitimacy as president is being widely questioned.
There has also been talk of dissolving the Palestinian Authority, as well, which certainly fits with the postponement of elections and Abbas's statement not to run. Constitutionally, failure to conduct elections by January 24, 2010 would mean that the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, a Hamas member, would assume the role. Obviously, neither Abbas, the US or Israel have publicly endorse that outcome.
That could leave the PLO, which Abbas is chairman of, as the main broker to assume control of the quasi-governing structures. It would get the leadership out of PA obligations, supposedly, and let them keep political representation in place; it could also serve their interests in their feud with Hamas.
Finally, they raised the threat of another unilateral declaration of independence (already tried that in 1988). How to pull that off with the rest of the political uncertainty seems implausible, and support from the world powers has not been forthcoming. Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt, whose country holds the EU presidency, told reporters "the conditions are not there as of yet." Some, such as Virginia Tilley, have noted the risks of such a move.
One idea for moving toward this aim is a popular referendum on the question. It would give it more legitimacy internationally. This was proposed by Victor Kattan in a piece published on the Guardian's website:
Rather than acting hastily and haphazardly, the best thing the PA could do if it is really intent on issuing a declaration of independence would be to consider holding a referendum along the lines recommended by the Badinter Arbitration Commission as regards the former Yugoslav republics. Of course, they would have to co-ordinate the logistics of such a referendum with Hamas. The one major advantage that the Palestinians have which differentiates their case from Kosovo is self-determination. As a people subject to an earlier type of colonial rule in the form of a mandate, the Palestinians are entitled to external self-determination. In their quest for independence they are entitled to seek support from the international community.He discusses how it could function as an effective tactic within the general UDI plan.
It would be politically difficult and hypocritical for Europe and the US to reject the popular will of the Palestinian people for a second time as they did when they opposed the outcome of the 2006 legislative elections. And even if they did oppose it, or if Israel placed obstacles in the way of holding a referendum, the PA would then have the necessary impetus and international support from the developing nations and the non-aligned movement to seek a majority vote in the UN general assembly for an authoritative advisory opinion from the international court of justice. In this regard an appropriate question for that court to consider might be the lawfulness of Israel's prolonged military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the implications this has for Palestinian statehood.Something clearly needs to be done as Israeli settlements expand, Jerusalem gets squeezed off, and Gaza dissipates. There can be no credible declaration of statehood without political unity or a clear mandate. A referendum would add to that, albeit only one part: the mandate. Kattan argues correctly the vote would need to be worked out with Hamas. In terms of implementing this tactic, that is true. But to make use of it politically, the lack of political unity, with the cooperative, coordinated action it entails, would be fatal.
Unity is vital to the national project. It can only accomplished through war or compromise; the current dynamic towards territorial secession with mutual factional repression clearly undermines the development of a "nation."
This overall shuffling about -- from the postponement of elections to the contemplation of declaring independence -- indicates that banking on the Obama administration was a distinct failure. The promises of change President Obama announced in Cairo soon gave way to deference for the Israeli position.
Now, the Palestinian leadership is trying to find a way out of their failed hopes in American foreign policy. Long unwilling to parlay international sympathies or build international solidarity on the ground, the Palestinian leadership is now left with no clear way forward.
