What’s behind Israeli Settler Violence?

I was happy to see the lengthy article by Daniel Byman and Natan Sachs on The Rise of Settler Terrorism in Foreign Affairs as well as seeing a condensed version of the same in The New York Times. Anything that can be done to shed light further on this under-discussed and persistent danger to Palestinian livelihood is a step in the right direction. There are, however, some important areas of disagreement I have with the authors about the causes of settler violence that are critical to bring to the fore because it helps inform efforts to stop it.

Byman and Sachs argue

The rise in settler radicalism stems from several key factors: the growth of the settler population over the past generation, the diversification of religious and ideological strands among it, and the sense of betrayal felt by settlers following Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005.

Readers of this blog will know that The Palestine Center has maintained a project on Israeli Settler Violence for several years. We've recorded data on incidents and amassed a database of daily events spanning eight years. We've made multiple presentations using this information and earlier this year published a comprehensive report on Israeli Settler Violence entitled "When Settlers Attack."

In the analysis of the data for this report we tested a variety of explanations for settler violence and a full discussion of this is included therein. Here, however, are a few key facts that call Byman and Sachs explanations into questions.

First, and perhaps most obviously, the dramatic spike in settler violence which has been prevalent over the past five years (315 percent) is wildly disproportionate to the growth of the settler population over the same period and even the past ten or twenty years. Sure the settler population has undoubtedly gone up over the past five, ten and twenty years, but the recent spike must be explained by something different.

Second, variation in settler violence has less to do with religiosity and more to do with structural factors like geography and security jurisdiction. We go through this extensively in our report. Many of the most violent settlements are religious or ideological settlements but settler violence has emanated from the vast majority of settlements. This pattern has also been consistent over time and probably doesn't explain the spike in recent years.

Third, "price tag" attacks, which feature prominently in the article by Byman and Sachs are really a small fraction of Israeli settler violence. Most settler violence is not reactionary, neither to Palestinian violence or Israeli government actions. Most settler violence happens because nothing stops it from happening.

This brings us to why this is important. When we superimposed settler violence over a map of the West Bank that showed Areas A, B and C, we noticed a very important trend. The vast majority of settler violence happens in areas where Israel has security jurisdiction under the Oslo agreements. About 90 percent of all villages that are attacked multiple times are in these areas. Despite the fact that some settlements, like Bracha for example, are geographically closer to Palestinian targets in Area A they rarely attack those targets and choose instead to attack further Palestinian targets in Areas B and C. Why is that? Well, to put it bluntly, they might very well get shot by Palestinian security in Area A but the deterrents in areas B and C are virtually non-existent.

I believe the reason for the spike in recent years is that increased activity in settler violence after the 2005 Gaza disengagement was met with little or no deterrence. This emboldened violent settlers to continue to push the limits of what was acceptable violence year after year. They have yet to meet that limit, mostly because of the failure of the Israeli state to introduce it to them, and that is why each of the last five years has seen new records in the number of violent settler incidents.

I agree with some of Byman and Sachs prescriptions. The Israeli justice system has to start arresting violent settlers and properly adjudicating sentences. Settlers more often than not escape prosecution all together and in many cases commit violence in plain sight of, and sometimes with the assistance of, state agents like soldiers, police or border patrols. In the demonstration in our report we also noted that the U.S. must do more to press Israel on settler violence and to close down opportunities to direct U.S. tax payer dollars to settlements through tax-exempt organizations.

But without a targeted effort that takes into account the imbalance of deterrence between Israeli settlements and Palestinian villages, settler violence is likely to continue. The most dangerous settlements are well known and so are the most vulnerable villages. If the Israelis are not going to permit Palestinian police to protect Palestinians civilians in these areas, the Israeli state must dedicate targeted resources to their protection. The protection of the civilian population is, after all, the primary responsibility of the occupier. When it comes to settler violence, as in the case of so many other issues, the Israelis have sadly not only failed to protect the civilian population but have worked to enable their endangerment. 

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