Shifting Right? An Analysis of the Israeli Vote

In a recent post, I highlighted the impact of settlers on the Israeli election outcome in 2009. Now that the 2013 election is over, we can look at trends in comparison to 2009  and have a better understanding of the dynamics in the polity. Let's try to answer a few questions.

1. Did Palestinian citizens of Israel vote, and at what rate?

In comparison to 2009, the turnout in Arab towns actually increased overall in 2013 (from 52 percent to 55 percent) despite being well below the turnout numbers in non-Arab areas. This was, however, not a uniform increase across the Arab towns. Some larger Arab towns saw decreases in voter turnout from 2009 including Umm al Fahm (-2 percent), Sakhnin (-3 percent), Baqa al Gharbiyeh (-6 percent) and Qalansweh (-6 percent). Other larger Arab towns saw increases including Rahat (+16 percent), Shefa'amr (+5 percent), Mghar (+2 percent), Judeide (+6 percent) and Yafet-an-Nasra (+11 percent). 

Of course, the Palestinian voting population in Israeli elections is not limited only to the predominantly Arab towns, but some eight to ten percent of the Palestinian citizen of Israel population lives in the "mixed-cities" including Akka, Haifa, Yaffa (part of the Tel Aviv municipality), Ramleh and Al-Lyd. The voter turn out in these cities in 2009 was approximately 59 percent and rose to 61 percent in 2013. It isn't possible to parse out Arab votes in these mixed cities. 

2. What was settler turn out like, and who did the settlers vote for?

The settler turnout also increased four percentage points over 2009 but perhaps the most important aspect of settler turnout is not how much higher it is from the previous year, but how much higher it is from the rest of the non-settler vote. Turnout in the settlements was about 78 percent, which is significantly higher than the aggregate turnout in the rest of the polity. Unlike the Arab vote, this increase was far more uniform across the settlements. The large settlements all saw increases in turnout over 2009 including Maale Addumim (+5 percent), Modiin Ilit (+4 percent), Betar Ilit (+9 percent) and Ariel (+1 percent). This is one area where Naftali Bennett's party actually did significant damage to the Likud-Beiteinu list. In 2009, for example, the aggregate of Likud and Beiteinu lists received 2.8 settler votes to over 2.1 votes that the aggregate of Jewish Home and National Union received  This time around, it was the inverse. The Jewish Home list garnered 3.5 settlers votes to every 2.6 that the Likud-Beiteinu list earned. What these numbers, along with the increase voter turnout, suggests is that Bennett was actually able to bring new votes into play from the settlements that were not a factor before. 

Another interesting tidbit of information (a proxy of sorts for settler expansion): the number of eligible voters in the settlements (residents 18 and older, not including settlements in occupied Jerusalem) increased  from 127,800 in 2009 to 186,185 in 2013. That's a 45 percent increase. The rest of the polity eligible voters increased 6.2 percent. With their consistently and significantly higher birthrates and turnout, the settler population is coming of age in larger numbers than the rest of the population and on pace to have an increased and significant impact on Israeli politics into the future. 

3. Is the electorate shifting right?

In the Arab towns, the increase in eligible voters over their four year period was almost 16 percent. But, for the sake of argument, let's remove both the Arab vote and the settler vote from the equation. How is the non-settler, non-Arab Israeli vote split? Rather than perpetuate these misnomers of right and left which are less appropriate for this type of system (I explain more of this here), I'd rather look at it as the divide between Netanyahu's friends, or natural allies, and his "frenemies" (those who have been in opposition but could still join his coalition).

It looks like this:

Certain parties, like Shas and United Torah Judaism, can rely on an ethno-religious voting constituency that is fairly stable but also growing. The Jewish Home party, as demonstrated above, has grown significantly and is on pace to continue to do so due to demographics. The most flexible of the parties on Netanyahu's side of the divide is Netanyahu's, but it is also the largest by far. The Arab vote is also going to continue to grow, and if anything can be guaranteed, it is that they will continue to be incompatible with Zionist parties. The Zionist parties in opposition to Netanyahu consistently exclude Arabs from possible coalitions. But a steady and growing Arab voting block means the space for the Zionist non-Netanyahu vote continues to shrink. Add to this the fact that the settler vote, which is naturally allied with Netanyahu and again not reflected in this chart, is also steady and growing, significantly. 

So this means that, yes, structurally Israeli politics is set on a high-speed course toward the right. There really isn't any other realistic option. There is only one way this really changes. Something revolutionary needs to occur among non-Arab, non-settler Israeli voters to shake up this dynamic. In a sense this already has, and the popular mobilization that brought Israelis into the streets in 2011 to protest the high price of cottage cheese, among other things, was reflected in the relative success of parties like Yesh Atid and Labor. 

But the total absence of political mobilization against Netanyahu's colonial policies toward the Palestinians was also reflected. Parties like Labor and Yesh Atid, which are the so-called "center-left," are largely mute when it comes to challenging the occupation. If anything, Lapid's support for perpetual Israeli control of settlements like Ariel and Maale Addumim, plus his insistence on the perpetual occupation of of Jerusalem, shows that the "center" itself has moved right on issues related to occupation and Palestinians. 

So what are the chances that another such shakeup can happen, but this time focused on Israel's occupation policies? Slim to none. Israel runs a brutal military occupation over millions of disenfranchised Palestinians and has done so for decades, but the vast majority of Israelis are detached from this reality. The occupation has become relatively cost-free for Israelis. Violence against Israelis from the West Bank is down to historically low levels. Those few Israelis who actually travel through the West Bank are relieved from the eye-sore of occupation through by-pass roads and apartheid walls. And, most importantly, should any third party attempt to place costs on Israel for its occupation and colonization, the United States is right there to ensure it doesn't happen.

It comes down to this: Israeli voters believed the costs of cottage cheese were more unbearable than the cost of occupation. Until that changes, nothing else will. 

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